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Abstract 
In countries highly dependent on their mineral resource sectors, the failure to diversify industrial 
activity is sometimes characterized as a resource curse. Several factors which are known to be 
harmful for economic development, such as a lower level of education and poor governance, have 
been shown to be present in resource-dependent countries. It is not clear, however, whether a 
resource curse is merely the natural outcome of organizing an economy around its resource sector 
based on a country’s factor endowments. If the resource industry does not need a particularly well 
educated labor force or a highly developed legal system, it is not surprising that those areas do not 
develop in countries with a large resource sector.  
This thesis focuses on unraveling the link between the resource curse and finance. All three 
articles take a different approach to the same question: does finance play a role in enhancing the 
resource curse? The first article, using cross-country panel data, presents evidence that domestic 
bank lending to the private sector is less common and the use of market-based finance more 
common in resource-dependent countries than in their resource-poor counterparts. That could 
create an environment difficult for small firms or emerging industries, which are known to rely 
on domestic bank lending.  
The second article enters more deeply into the reasons behind this first finding and, using 
firm-level data, presents evidence that resource firms use less debt and debt of longer maturity 
than other non-financial firms. Similarly, firms in other sectors in resource-dependent countries 
have less debt than firms with similar characteristics in other countries. The results suggest that 
resource firms have demand for a certain type of finance, which could steer the supply of financial 
services in resource-dependent countries.  
The third article shows empirical evidence that an oil price collapse adversely affects leverage 
of not only resource firms but also other firms in resource-dependent countries. In other countries, 
however, only the resource sector is harmed by the fall in oil price.  This fact suggests that 
volatility is one channel through which the resources affect finance in resource-dependent 
countries. 
All in all, the results show that finance is a channel through which the resource curse operates. 
Resource firms have demand for a certain type of financial services, which could affect the supply 
of financial services in resource-dependent countries. The financial sector could be formed to 
serve the needs of large resource firms, and it perhaps leaves other types of firms with inadequate 
service. Moreover, external commodity price shocks adversely affect firm leverage growth in 
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resource-dependent countries. Consequently, addressing the financial needs of non-resource firms 
in resource-dependent countries could help to mitigate the resource curse.  
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Tiivistelmä 
Monissa raaka-ainevaroiltaan rikkaissa maissa talouden on havaittu kehittyvän muita maita 
heikommin ja tätä ilmiötä kutsutaan usein raaka-ainekiroukseksi. Muun muassa alhainen 
koulutustaso sekä heikko hallinto ovat tekijöitä, jotka näyttävät esiintyvän tyypillisesti yhdessä 
suurten raaka-ainevarojen kanssa. Mikäli kaivannaisteollisuus ei tarvitse korkeasti koulutettua 
työvoimaa tai kehittynyttä lainsäädäntöä, ei ole yllättävää että ne yhteiskunnan alueet eivät raaka-
aineriippuvaisissa maissa kehity. Raaka-ainekirouksen onkin havaittu toimivan osittain talouden 
instituutioiden kautta. 
Tämä väitöskirja keskittyy tutkimaan raaka-aineriippuvuuden ja rahoitussektorin yhteyttä, 
sillä myös rahoitussektori voi olla raaka-aineista riippuvaisissa maissa erilainen kuin muissa 
maissa. Kaikki kolme osatyötä lähestyvät eri kulmista samaa kysymystä: ruokkiiko 
rahoitussektorin toiminta raaka-ainekirousta?  
Ensimmäisessä osatyössä esitetään, että raaka-aineista riippuvaisissa maissa on muita maita 
pienempi pankkisektori ja markkinaehtoisen rahoituksen käyttäminen on yleisempää. Tällainen 
ympäristö voi heikentää pienten ja nuorten yritysten mahdollisuuksia saada rahoitusta, sillä ne 
ovat tyypillisesti riippuvaisia kotimaisista pankeista. 
Toisessa osatyössä pureudutaan ensimmäisessä löydetyn ilmiön syihin käyttämällä yritysten 
tilinpäätöstietoja 70 eri maasta. Aineiston avulla osoitetaan, että raaka-aineyritykset ovat 
vähemmän velkaantuneita ja niiden lainojen laina-aika on pidempi kuin muilla yrityksillä. Kun 
rajataan tarkastelu raaka-aineriippuvaisiin maihin, havaitaan, että myös muiden alojen yritykset 
käyttävät vähemmän lainarahaa mikäli ne sijaitsevat raaka-aineistaan riippuvaisissa maissa. Tulos 
viittaa siihen, että maan suuri raaka-ainesektori voi vaikuttaa myös muiden alojen yritysten 
pääomarakenteeseen. 
Kolmannessa osatyössä osoitetaan, että öljyn hinnan romahdus vähentää raaka-aineista 
riippuvaisissa maissa sekä raaka-aineyhtiöiden että muiden yritysten velkaantuneisuutta, kun 
muissa maissa haitallinen vaikutus tuntuu vain raaka-aineyhtiöillä. Tämä ilmiö viittaa siihen, että 
raaka-aineiden hintojen voimakas liikehdintä on yksi kanava, mitä kautta raaka-aineriippuvuus 
heikentää talouden kehitystä. 
Tulokset osoittavat, että rahoitussektori on yksi reitti, mitä kautta raaka-ainekirous toimii. 
Raaka-ainesektorin yrityksillä on tietynlaiset rahoitustarpeet, mikä voi vaikuttaa koko raaka-
aineista riippuvaisen maan rahoituksen tarjontaan. Mikäli rahoitussektori on keskittynyt 
palvelemaan raaka-ainesektorin yrityksiä, se ei välttämättä tarjoa talouden muille sektoreille 
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sopivia palveluita. Lisäksi raaka-aineiden hintojen voimakas pudotus heikentää muidenkin alojen 
yritysten rahoitusta raaka-aineista riippuvaisissa maissa. Raaka-ainekirousta voitaisiin siis 
mahdollisesti lieventää löytämällä ratkaisuja talouden muiden sektoreiden rahoitustarpeisiin. 
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1 Introduction 
It seems intuitive that natural resource wealth, like any other wealth, should be beneficial for 
countries’ economic performance. However, as mineral resources have been shown to be harmful 
for growth (see e.g. Sachs and Warner 2001), a large branch of literature has emerged around this 
puzzle to explain the adverse effect of mineral resources on economic development, an effect 
known as the resource curse. 
Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) take a historical perspective on 
the economic development and develop a colonial endowment view. Colonies built around few 
immigrants managing resources with large returns to scale failed to develop stable institutions and 
were left behind in economic development, whereas colonies with large numbers of immigrants 
with dispersed assets managed to create sustainable economic growth over centuries. These 
findings suggest that beneficial institutions, such as education systems, franchise and land 
ownership are not exogenous in any way, but stem from countries’ factor endowments. La Porta 
et al. (1998) also show that a country’s legal background affects the development of the financial 
sector. 
Countries with vast mineral resources have been shown to under educate their people 
(Gylfason 2001) and tend to suffer from poor governance and rent-seeking behavior (Bardhan 
1997). These countries also have more incentives for trade policy closure and a lower level of 
economic diversification than their resource-poor counterparts (Auty 2001). Frankel (2010) 
summarizes the channels through which the resource abundance is discovered to harm the 
economic development, a phenomenon known as the resource curse: long-term trends in world 
commodity prices, volatility, crowding out of manufacturing, civil war, poor institutions, and the 
Dutch Disease are all potential causes for poor economic performance associated with mineral 
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resources. Despite the extensive literature on the field, the role of the financial sector has received 
very limited attention. 
Factor endowments, that is, labor, capital and natural resources affect not only institutions but 
also the development of industrial sectors in a country. Countries with substantial mineral wealth 
naturally have a large resource extraction sector. The production sector of the economy then 
further affects the development of the institutions. More specifically, Lin et al. (2009) argue that 
the financial sector of the economy is formed based on the needs of the production sector. Large 
firms in capital intensive industries are better served by big banks or financial markets, whereas 
smaller labor intensive firms are better off with smaller local banks. Institutions also evolve 
together with economic development (Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen et al. 2011). 
Although initial natural resource endowments can be considered to be exogenous, over time 
their use and conservation depends greatly on country-specific factors and can then be considered 
endogenous. However, exogenous shocks from commodity prices continue to affect countries 
with large mineral resources.  
The goal of this research is to disclose the role of finance in resource-dependent countries. 
The main hypothesis is that, when the resource sector is sufficiently large, it can shape the 
financial institutions in the country to the extent that they do not provide adequate service for 
other types of firms. In addition, when the resource-dependent economy continues to be hit by 
exogenous commodity price shocks, the financial sector can either be a buffer or an accelerator to 
these shocks. Identifying the channels through which the resource curse hampers the economic 
performance of the country is the way to find the cure for the curse. 
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1.1 Natural resources, financial sector and capital structure 
Throughout this thesis, countries where minerals’ share of total exports exceeds 40% are defined 
as resource-dependent, and the data for fuel and metals exports is extracted from World Bank 
World Development Indicators. Diamond exports are also included in total mineral exports for 
major diamond producers when the data is available. Export dependence, previously used by e.g. 
Nili and Rastad (2007) indicates whether the country’s competitiveness is based mainly on 
mineral resources. I also use subsoil wealth and non-manufacturing industrial production as 
alternative measures of resource-dependence to confirm the results in the first article. Resource 
firms are based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Firms with the industry 
name of "Metals & Mining" or "Oil & Gas Exploration & Production" or the sub-industry name 
of "Oil & Gas Drilling", “Integrated Oil & Gas" or "Coal & Consumable Fuels" are classified as 
resource firms in the second article. That is, firms from the energy sector are not included if they 
are concentrated on transportation, marketing or equipment, as I focus only on the mineral 
extraction. However, in the third article, when studying the effects of oil price changes, I include 
the whole sector “Energy” in the group of resource firms, excluding only the sub-industry “Oil & 
Gas Refining & Marketing” from the energy sector, as Lee and Ni (2002) show that, in contrast 
to the energy sector in general, the refining industry, which uses commodities as an input, benefits 
from a lower oil price. 
Like other institutions, a country’s financial sector is not exogenously determined. 
Development of the financial sector is a continuous process, where development level, factor 
endowments, existing industries and institutional and regulatory environment reshape the 
financial sector. (Lin et al. 2009; Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2011) 
All in all, the importance of finance for economic development has received much attention 
in the previous literature (e.g. King, Levine 1993). Levine (2005) summarizes the existing 
knowledge of the role of the financial sector. The financial system helps to manage risk, mobilizes 
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savings and allocates capital. It also has an important role in monitoring investments and 
exercising post-financing corporate governance. The financial system also facilitates the exchange 
of goods and services. 
By a significant margin, the literature on the structure of the financial sector has concentrated 
around the superiority of bank-based or market-based financial systems (Gerschenkron 1962; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999). Lin et al. (2009) argue that bigger firms are better served by 
big banks and that smaller firms benefit from a more dispersed banking sector. 
Resource endowments are likely to lead to a large resource sector. A large resource sector 
affects institutions including the financial sector, as the financial sector is used to serve resource 
firms, not necessarily other types of firms. Moreover, the resource firms might be uninterested in 
the development of the domestic financial sector if they are big enough to tap international capital 
markets. Even an elite of incumbents might exist, with an interest in hampering the development 
of the financial sector to prevent competition. Beck (2011) shows some preliminary empirical 
evidence that the financial sector is indeed smaller in resource-dependent countries than 
elsewhere. Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) argue that the resource curse is just a red herring 
and that the true challenge for the resource-dependent countries is the economic volatility that 
follows from the commodity price movements. They further suggest that a developed financial 
sector can mitigate the external shocks from commodity prices. 
The capital structure of the firm is not independent of the institutional environment of the 
country, either. Fan et al. (2012) show that a country’s level of corruption, legal and tax system, 
and preference for capital suppliers explain a large part of the variation in capital structure. 
However, these institutional factors can be affected by the country’s resource wealth, which 
provides one channel through which the resources affect firm capital structure. 
The motivation for unraveling the capital structure puzzle by looking at the capital structure 
of resource firms stems from the dominant role of the resource sector in resource-dependent 
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economies. If the resource firms have a certain capital structure, that could steer the supply of 
finance by creating a standard offering of financial services based on the needs of the major sector 
in the economy. In this way, the existing resource sector could indirectly affect the capital 
structure of other firms in a resource-dependent country, providing another channel from 
resources to capital structure of a firm. 
The extensive literature on firm capital structure is not unambiguous, but a common 
understanding is that the assumptions of the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) of 
frictionless financial markets are unrealistic. That is, it is fair to assume that firms cannot choose 
their capital structure freely.  
Frank and Goyal (2009) summarize what we know about the determinants of firm capital 
structure. Both the book and market leverage of a firm are supported by asset tangibility and high 
median industry leverage, whereas high profitability is associated with lower leverage levels. 
Most evidence also points to bigger firms having higher leverage, firms with a high market-to-
book ratio having lower leverage levels and firms in countries with a high inflation rate having 
higher leverage.  
In some studies, volatility has also been shown to be an important determinant of firm capital 
structure. Bradley et al. (1984) show that earnings volatility is negatively associated to firm 
leverage, whereas e.g. Titman and Wessels (1988) find no evidence of earnings volatility affecting 
the firm capital structure.  
Following the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, the literature on the changes in firm capital 
structure after a shock has grown rapidly. With US data, Harrison and Widjaja (2014) show that 
the role of assets tangibility increased after the financial crisis as a determinant for leverage. 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) use data on US firms to show evidence of firms increasing their 
leverage to secure liquidity rapidly after the beginning of the financial crisis. Using data from 
Western Europe, Iqbal and Kume (2014) show that firm leverage ratios first increase during the 
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financial crisis but decrease again after the crisis.  Zeitun et al. (2016) present empirical evidence 
from GCC countries, which are resource-dependent, that leverage ratios decreased after the 
financial crisis due to the lack of supply by lenders.  
All in all, the resource sector has not been at the center of the capital structure literature. 
Similarly, the response to oil price shocks by resource firms or firms in resource-dependent 
countries has not been extensively studied. However, the theoretical framework for the response 
in the financial sector provides a suitable framework for empirical studies. Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997) show that flight to quality in lending is initiated by a credit crunch, a collateral squeeze or 
a savings squeeze. A fall in oil price can cause a collateral squeeze as resource asset values are 
depreciated, and that could be of significant magnitude in resource-dependent countries.  
According to Bernanke et al. (1996), borrowers with high agency costs of borrowing are likely to 
be most affected by an economic downturn. Thus, a credit crunch swiftly affects smaller, younger 
and less capitalized firms. This “flight to quality” coincides with a reduction in economic activity 
(Lang and Nakamura 1995).  
External shocks from commodity prices lead to further re-allocation of resources. Hamilton 
(1983) suggests that oil price increases have played a role in initiating U.S. recessions after World 
War II. Gilbert and Mork (1986) argue that, regardless of direction, oil price change causes some 
costly resource re-allocation.  The literature linking oil price movements to the output growth of 
industries or equity market performance confirms that the oil price shocks affect different 
industries and countries differently (Nandha and Faff 2008; Lee and Ni 2002; Scholtens and 
Yurtsever 2012; Park and Ratti 2008). Oil producers and exporting countries benefit from the rise 
in the oil price at the cost of the end users. 
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1.2 Panel data methods 
All the three articles take an empirical approach, using cross-country panel data. In the first article 
dynamic multivariate regression analysis is used to detect special characteristics of the financial 
sector in resource-dependent countries. I use a fixed effects estimator, which however is known 
to have bias in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (Nickell 1981). Thus, the results 
are verified with the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimator, which according to Judson and Owen 
(1999) is suitable for unbalanced panels with more than 10 time periods. However, despite the 
biased behavior, the fixed effects estimator has been shown by simulations to work well with 
cross-country growth regressions with more than five time periods, as it is more efficient than the 
AH-estimator (Gaduh 2002). 
The second article uses an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator on firm capital structure 
data. As shown by Petersen (2009), estimating finance panel data sets with OLS and White 
standard errors results in biased standard errors with confidence intervals typically too small. 
However, this problem is corrected by clustering the standard errors by firm.   
The difference-in-differences methodology used in the third article is a quasi-experimental 
approach well suited to estimate the effects of a sudden change in economic environment (Angrist 
and Krueger 1999). Two recent oil price collapses, the first in 2008 in conjunction with the 
beginning of a global financial crisis and the second in 2014, unrelated to any wider economic 
downturn, provide an environment for studying the differences in the change in leverage for more 
affected resource firms or firms domiciled in resource-dependent countries versus firms in other 
industries or in other countries. The crucial pre-condition for the validity of inference using a 
difference-in-differences estimator is that the compared treatment and control groups exhibit 
similar growth trends in the dependent variable before the shock. That is, without the shock, the 
growth rates would have continued to be similar. The shortcoming of the difference-in-differences 
approach is the difficulty in extrapolating the results outside the sample.   
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In a simple form the difference-in-differences estimator becomes 
??? ?? ??? ? ???????????? ? ??????????? ? ?????????????????????? ? ???, (1) 
where ???? is the dependent variable for individual i in time t, and where ?????????? is an 
indicator function that receives value 1 if the observation belongs to the treatment group and, 
otherwise, receives value 0. Similarly, ????????? receives value 1 if the observation is from post-
treatment period and, otherwise, 0. ???????????????????? is the difference-in-differences term, 
and ??? is the random error. 
The interpretation of the parameters is the following. ?? is the pre-treatment coefficient for 
the control group, and ?? is the pre-treatment difference of the treatment group from the control 
group. ?? is the post-treatment difference in the coefficient for the control group from its pre-
treatment coefficient. The main interest in the difference-in-differences estimator lies in the 
coefficient ??, which is the difference in post-treatment differences between the treatment and 
control groups. It describes whether the reaction to the shock differs between the treatment and 
the control group. 
In some regressions in the third article, I use nearest neighbor propensity score matching, 
introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to find a suitable control group for each of the 
treatment groups. This approach is motivated by heterogeneous groups in the data, and the goal is 
to adjust the data prior to the parametric analysis to reduce the relationship between the treatment 
group and the independent variables without causing bias or inefﬁciency. This nonparametric 
preprocessing can greatly reduce the model dependence in the parametric estimations.  
1.3 Empirical findings 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in several ways. The first article shows previously 
undisclosed characteristics of the financial sector in economies which have a high share of mineral 
resources in their exports. At a low level of export dependence on minerals, the increasing mineral 
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share coincides with higher financial sector development measured by bank lending to the private 
sector. However, when the export share of minerals exceeds 6%, this correlation already turns 
negative, and resources seem to be harmful for banking sector development.  
Although the country fixed effect seems to capture that threshold, multivariate dynamic panel 
data regressions confirm the initial finding: bank lending to the domestic private sector is less 
common in resource-dependent countries than in their resource-poor counterparts. This result is 
in line with the preliminary result by Beck (2011). Moreover, I find evidence that capital markets 
are more commonly used in resource-dependent countries than in other countries, confirming that 
the financial sector structure in resource-dependent countries is well suited to serve bigger firms. 
Now, is the observed financial sector structure a result of the demand for certain types of 
financial services by the resource firms? Although the capital structure of the firm has been 
extensively studied, the special characteristics of the capital structure in the resource sector is, to 
the best of my knowledge, previously unexposed. I approach this question by using extensive 
cross-country firm level data, and I find clear evidence that resource firms tend to have a lower 
level of leverage and longer debt maturity than non-financial firms in other industries. 
Interestingly, other firms in resource-dependent countries are also drawn to a similar capital 
structure, which does suggest that the resource sector might affect the range of financial services 
available in a resource-dependent country. 
In addition to this endogenous mechanism, resources could affect other sectors of the economy 
through external commodity price shocks. I study two events of recent oil price collapse and their 
impact on firms’ leverage growth. I find evidence that oil price falls are followed by a deceleration 
in credit growth in resource-dependent countries for both resource and non-resource firms. The 
slower credit growth in non-resource sectors appears to be explained not solely by the 
deteriorating growth opportunities but also by flight to quality in lending, as bigger firms with 
low leverage and high asset tangibility are better off than smaller firms or firms with weaker 
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balance sheets. All in all, these firm-level results confirm the macroeconomic findings of Van der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) that economic volatility caused by the commodity prices is harmful 
for economic development in resource-dependent countries. 
1.4 Summary of the chapters 
The second chapter, by using panel regressions, shows that the domestic banking sector is smaller 
and the use of market-based financing is more common in resource-dependent countries than in 
other countries, even when controlling for several other country-specific determinants. There is 
also a very low threshold after which the natural resource dependence begins to be harmful for 
financial sector development. 
Three alternative hypotheses are presented to explain the particular kind of financial sector 
found in resource-dependent countries. First, according to the demand hypothesis, demand for 
finance by firms is likely to be different in different sectors, so the existence of a large resource 
sector could be responsible for the different financial structure of the country. Second, the interest 
group hypothesis based on Rajan and Zingales (2003) argues that the financial sector of a country 
is unlikely to be formed based purely on the demand for services, but there could be a strong elite 
in resource-dependent countries which has no interest in supporting the development of the 
financial sector. Third, the volatility hypothesis suggests that the financial sector remains small in 
resource-dependent economies due to the macroeconomic volatility caused by commodity price 
movements. 
The third chapter enters into the first hypothesis presented in the second chapter. Using an 
extensive micro-level dataset from listed firms in 70 different countries, it shows that resource 
firms seem indeed to have demand for certain types of financial services, as the capital structure 
of the resource firms is different from that of other firms even in developed countries and the 
United States. Resource firms have less debt and debt of longer maturity than other non-financial 
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firms. However, firms in other sectors, but domiciled in resource-dependent countries, also have 
less debt than their counterparts in other countries. That fact does not seem to be due to a different 
industrial mix. Thus, the results suggest that the large resource sector might steer the financial 
sector of the country towards a structure that serves resource firms well but that could provide 
inadequate service to sectors with very different needs.  
The fourth chapter takes the volatility hypothesis of Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) to 
the firm level and presents evidence, using difference-in-differences regressions, that recent oil 
price collapses have caused a reduction in firm leverage in resource-dependent countries not only 
for resource firms but also, in similar magnitude, for firms in other sectors as well. This firm-level 
evidence confirms the harmful effect of economic volatility caused by commodity prices. There 
is also some evidence of flight-to-quality following an oil price collapse, which could harm 
smaller firms even more than the listed firms in the sample used. However, the oil price collapses 
in 2008 and 2014 had slightly different consequences. In 2008, when the oil price drop coincided 
with a global financial crisis, the flight-to-quality seemed to play a role, whereas after the oil price 
drop in 2014, which was not associated with deterioration in global growth outlook, we find no 
evidence of flight to quality in our sample of listed firms. Nevertheless, in both cases the fall in 
the oil price was followed by deterioration in firm leverage for both resource and non-resource 
firms in resource-dependent countries, whereas in other countries only the resource sector was 
harmed.  
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2 Financial sector in resource dependent economies 
2.1 Introduction1 
Many resource-rich economies are unable to develop competitive industrial sectors outside 
the production of raw materials and experience lower economic growth rates than their resource-
poor counterparts. In particular, the previous literature on this resource trap or resource curse, well 
summarized by Frankel (2010), has found point-source resources, namely energy products and 
other minerals harmful for economic development. Several reasons for this underdevelopment of 
resource-rich economies have been suggested, such as low quality of institutions in resource-rich 
countries, economic uncertainty caused by commodity price volatility and the Dutch Disease. 
Nevertheless, the role of financial development in these economies has received very limited 
attention, even though the overall importance of the financial sector for economic development 
has been extensively studied. 
Levine (2005) summarizes the key functions of the financial sector addressed in the previous 
literature. The financial sector produces information on possible investments, allocates capital, 
monitors investments, and exerts post-financing corporate governance.  The financial system 
facilitates the trading, diversification and management of risk. It also mobilizes savings and eases 
the exchange of goods and services. 
As financial sector structure is expected to reflect the production structure of the economy 
(Lin et al. 2009), we presume that the financial sector in a resource-dependent economy is shaped 
                                                   
1 This chapter is based on an article with the same title, published in the Emerging Markets Review 23, 
208-229, 2015 
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by the needs of big well-known firms in the mineral extraction sector. That is, the domestic 
banking sector plays a smaller role and the use of capital markets is more common than in 
resource-poor countries. Lin et al. (2009) argue, that such a financial system is especially 
challenging for small- and medium-sized enterprises as well as for emerging industries. 
This is one of the first papers to investigate the structure of the financial sector in resource-
dependent economies.  We describe financial sector characteristics by presenting cross-country 
data on financial sector development and resource dependence based on an extensive dataset 
collected from different sources, covering large amount of countries and the period 1995 to 2009. 
We present empirical evidence that, even if we control for several other factors that previous 
literature has designated as important for financial sector growth, resource-dependence still has a 
dampening effect on domestic banking sector development, a result in line with preliminary work 
by Beck (2011). We also find evidence that the use of market-based financing is more common 
in resource-dependent economies. We confirm our results by using three alternative indicators of 
resource-dependence, namely export dependence, production dependence and subsoil wealth.    
We contribute to the still scarce literature linking the financial development and resource curse 
using more comprehensive data than the previous studies linking resource sector and finance, 
including often omitted diamond producers, and suggest that the negative link between resource-
dependence and financial development is not linear. Further, we contribute to the research related 
to financial sector development by presenting previously unrecognized characteristics of financial 
sector in resource-dependent economies, namely the larger role of market based finance. Natural 
resources as the countries’ third initial endowment in addition to labor and capital, have thus far 
received very limited attention as a driver of financial sector structure. We also suggest three 
alternative channels through which the resource wealth could cause the underdevelopment of the 
domestic banking sector. 
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The rest of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 introduces the related literature, 
section 3 discusses the data and estimation results, section 4 presents our interpretation of the 
results, and section 5 concludes.  
2.2 Explaining the structure of the financial sector 
There are several often-cited determinants of financial sector development. According to La Porta 
et al. (1997), investor protection is the key to financial sector development. Roe and Siegel (2011) 
argue that political instability impedes financial development. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) develop a colonial endowment view according to which colonies that have 
been run by a small elite of immigrants using plenty of unskilled local labor have tended to have 
weak property rights. These colonies were typically built around extraction industries or 
agriculture. In colonies settled by bigger groups of immigrants, stronger property rights, higher 
level s of education and stronger financial and economic development were present. Thus, 
beneficial institutions are not exogenously determined and more attention should be paid to the 
question of why institutions are less developed in some countries. 
A big branch of research has been focusing on structural issues, namely whether a bank-based 
or market-based financial sector is better for economic growth (see e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine 
1999). Gerschenkron (1962) suggests that banks are more efficient than markets in the early stages 
of development, when the institutional environment is underdeveloped. The idea is that banks are 
more powerful than individual investors in forcing firms to reveal their accounts and pay their 
debts. Securities markets offer mostly long-term funding, whereas banks are superior in offering 
funds for shorter term investments (Demirgüç-Kunt, Maksimovic 2002). There is some tendency 
for countries to become more market oriented as they become richer. Also, a low level of 
corruption, strong protection of shareholder rights and good accounting regulations tend to 
enhance market-based finance. However, an extensive deposit insurance scheme seems to support 
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bank-based financial system development (Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine 1999). Nevertheless, what 
matters for economic development, is the overall sector development; the relative mix of banks 
and markets is less important (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2011). However, this conclusion is drawn for 
developed economies. 
Bank size seems to play an important role. Small businesses usually have difficulties in 
obtaining loans from big banks, whereas small banks specialize in lending to small businesses. In 
small banks, lending decision makers are usually close to their clients and thus gather soft 
information on firms, such as information about the character of the firm’s managers, which can 
be effectively utilized in the lending decision. On the other hand, small banks are unable to finance 
big firms, as banks control risks by diversified lending portfolios. Big banks, in which lending 
decisions are typically made at rather high levels, tend to pay more attention to standard 
information, such as the firm’s financial statements, which are also more readily available to big 
firms. (Lin, Sun et al. 2009) 
Literature on new structural economics highlights the evolving role of the financial sector in 
different stages of economic development (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2011). Lin et al. (2009) point 
out that the optimal mix of banks and markets or of big and small banks depend on the economy’s 
factor endowments. The relative composition of labor, capital and natural resources define the 
optimal structure for production, and the production structure defines the optimal financial sector. 
Capital intensive countries tend to have big production firms and thus are better served by a 
market-based financial system or by big banks, whereas labor intensive economies have smaller 
firms that are better served by smaller local banks. However, their work does not pay much 
attention to the role of natural resources, although it is recognized as the third initial endowment.  
According to previous literature, resource-dependent economies indeed seem to suffer from 
many of the handicaps that can deter financial sector development. According to Bardhan (1997), 
resource abundance enhances rent-seeking and poor governance. Also, resource-rich economies 
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tend to under educate their people (Gylfason 2001). According to Auty (2001), there are four 
reasons why developmental states are associated with poor natural resource endowment: 1) low 
tolerance of the poor majority for rent extraction from the limited natural resources; 2) efficient 
use of scarce resources, and investments aimed at developing abundant assets such as human 
capital; 3) lacking booming commodities, resource poor countries have less incentive for trade 
policy closure; 4) diversification into competitive manufacturing begins at lower income levels.  
All in all, the literature on the relationship between resource abundance and financial 
development is still scarce. Preliminary study by Beck (2011) suggests that economies dependent 
on natural resources have lower level financial development. Further, he argues that the 
underdevelopment is not due to low quality of the financial sector. Yuxiang and Chen (2011) find 
evidence from provincial panel data of China, that negative link between financial development 
and resource abundance exists. Nili and Rastad (2007) find that oil economies have lower levels 
of financial development and that financial development has a net dampening effect on 
investments in oil economies due to the low quality of financial intermediation. Berglof and 
Lehmann (2009) argue that in the case of Russia, financial sector development does not seem to 
have unleashed the sectors that are dependent on external financing in developed economies. Bank 
lending is still of limited importance for corporate investment in Russia. 
2.3 Empirical research2 
2.3.1 Data description 
The data are mainly from the World Bank World Development Indicator (WDI) database, with 
additional financial sector indicators from Beck et al. (2010). To include as wide a range of 
countries as possible, we employ data for the period 1995 to 2009. We have three main reasons 
                                                   
2 All empirical analysis was conducted using R software 
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for choosing this period. First, many studies on resource dependent economies thus far have used 
older data, which do not include the post-Soviet states. As there are many clearly resource-
dependent economies in that region with a common history, it is reasonable to assume that leaving 
these countries out might cause some bias to the estimations. Second, according to Rajan and 
Zingales (2003a), financial sector development has only started to gather pace in the 1990s. Thus, 
regarding financial sector development, the past two decades are of the greatest significance. 
Third, we complement the WDI data using country specific mineral export statistics for diamond 
producing countries, where the data are not available for longer term. The sample data include all 
the 128 countries for which data were available. However, some variables are limited to a much 
smaller group. The time span is 15 years, and the panel is unbalanced. Countries are listed in 
Appendix 1. 
In considering resources, we focus on point-source resources, which are those extracted from 
a narrow geographic or economic base, such as oil and other minerals (Isham, Woolcock et al. 
2005). That is due to the fact that all mineral resources seem to cause problems for economies that 
can be broadly described as the resource curse, whereas e.g. land and forest resources do not cause 
similar problems (Murshed 2004).  However, WDI data appear to have one deficiency: mineral 
exports comprise only energy and most of the important metals, whereas in some countries 
production and export of precious stones plays an important role. Thus, we used country-specific 
statistics to add the share of precious stones in total exports for major diamond producers where 
data were available3. The effect of precious stones, ignored in the WDI statistics, should be more 
thoroughly captured in our second indicator of resource dependence, non-manufacturing 
industrial production as a share of total production. However, that indicator also includes the 
                                                   
3 Central Bank of Angola, Central Statistics Office of Botswana, Statistical yearbook of Congo republic, 
Ghana statistical service, Statistics Namibia 
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utilities sector. The third indicator of resource-dependence, subsoil assets, includes only the 
energy products and metals recorded by the World Bank (2006).4 
The variables used to describe resource-dependence are as follows: 
i. MEXPORT: share of minerals on total merchandise exports, our main variable for 
describing resource dependence. This is a commonly used indicator (e.g. Nili, Rastad 2007) of 
resource dependence. We use it to describe export dependence, preferring it to another often used 
indicator, mineral exports to GDP. Share of minerals in total exports indicates whether the external 
competitiveness of the economy depends totally on the minerals sector.   
ii. MQPROXY: share of non-manufacturing production in total industrial production. 
It is used as a proxy to describe production dependence on mining and quarrying. These data are 
readily available from WDI database, but we have not seen it used earlier to describe resource 
dependence. Its strength is its availability, and its shortcoming is that it also includes the third 
industrial sector, the utilities sector. 
iii. SUBSOIL: ratio of subsoil assets in 2000 to GDP (Brunnschweiler, Bulte 2008). 
This is used because it is an exogenous indicator of resource abundance. The first figures were 
collected by World Bank for 1995, but these were limited to a much smaller group of countries 
than the later observations in 2000 and 2005.  
Following previous literature, we consider the following key variables as indicators of 
domestic financial sector development: 
i. PCRED: ratio of commercial bank credit to private sector to GDP. This is our 
preferred measure of banking sector size, as it best describes the market-determined banking 
sector and is also very commonly used. (Levine et al. 2000) 
                                                   
4 Recorded products include oil, gas, coal, bauxite, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, nickel, phosphate rock, 
silver, tin and zinc. 
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ii. M2: ratio of money supply (M2) to GDP. Money supply (often called also as broad 
money or liquid liabilities) is commonly used as an indicator of financial depth. This measure of 
banking sector size is broader than PCRED, as it includes the sum of currency outside banks, 
demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign 
currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. We use this indicator in 
addition to private credit, as it includes public sector or more precisely public enterprises as well, 
which might be of importance in resource-dependent economies. (Levine et al. 2000) 
iii. RATESPREAD: interest rate spread between bank lending and deposits; used as 
an indicator for domestic banking sector quality (Koivu 2002). 
 
Further, to achieve a more thorough analysis of financial sector characteristics, we use the 
following variables from Beck et al. (2010): 
 
iv. STMKTCAP: ratio of domestic stock market capitalization to GDP, used as an 
indicator for domestic market-based sources for finance. (Levine, Zervos 1998) 
v. INTLDEBT: ratio of international debt issues to GDP indicates degree of access to 
international capital markets. This measure includes international debt issues by government and 
state-owned enterprises.   
vi. NRBLOAN: ratio of loans by non-resident banks to GDP, used to indicate the use 
of foreign bank loans as a source of finance. Again, this measure includes the public sector. 
Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for selected financial sector indicators are 
presented in Table 1. It is noteworthy that our main indicator of resource dependence, the mineral 
export share of total exports is highly correlated with the two other resource indicators. In other 
words, countries abundant with mineral resources and also countries extracting the resources also 
seem to export them. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of selected variables 
 
 
We also use several control variables (from WDI unless otherwise noted), the most important 
being GDP per capita, to control for income level, as richer countries tend to have a more 
developed financial sector even relative to GDP. Secondary school enrollment is used to indicate 
the level of education (Gylfason 2001). Foreign direct investment to GDP describes the foreign 
firms’ participation in the economy.  GDP growth is used, as rapid growth might hamper financial 
sector development, measured against GDP. Inflation is used to describe macroeconomic stability, 
and several studies have shown inflation to have a direct effect on financial sector development 
(Boyd et al. 2001). Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) is used to control for raw materials 
prices, which can clearly affect the export share of commodities and also strongly influence some 
financial sector indicators, such as stock market capitalization, in resource-rich economies. 
Energy products account for roughly 79% of index composition, metals account for about 8% and 
the rest is other commodities.   An index of economic freedom is used as a proxy for quality of 
institutions, as institutional underdevelopment has been argued to be a major cause of both the 
GDP/cap 
USD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Descriptive statistics
Mean 27.06 47.91 0.94 39.26 42.97 46.88 17.29 20.34 5248
Std. Dev. 30.20 20.73 2.00 39.10 32.32 53.84 28.21 44.18 8733
Min 0.00 10.19 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 81
Max 99.67 98.35 11.62 231.10 242.24 340.29 344.39 379.12 42133
Obs 1692 1780 1713 1827 1817 1158 942 1740 1973
Correlations
1 1
2 0.8 *** 1
3 0.73 *** 0.61 *** 1
4 -0.22 *** -0.14 *** -0.22 *** 1
5 -0.28 *** -0.2 *** -0.23 *** 0.8 *** 1
6 0.04 0.03 -0.07 * 0.62 *** 0.49 *** 1
7 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 * 0.26 *** 0.08 ** 0.29 *** 1
8 -0.15 *** 0.03 -0.12 *** 0.29 *** 0.23 *** 0.18 *** 0.39 *** 1
9 -0.05 0.01 -0.1 ** 0.68 *** 0.48 *** 0.43 *** 0.47 *** 0.18 *** 1
Significance level for Pearson correlations of 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
International 
debt 
issues/GDP
Loans from 
non-resident 
banks/GDP
Mineral 
export share, 
%
Non-
manufacturin
g production 
share, %
Subsoil 
assets to GDP
Private credit 
to GDP, %
M2/GDP, %
Stock market 
capitalizatio
n/GDP
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resource curse (Auty 2001) and the low level financial sector development (Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Levine 1999). We also use bank concentration measured by the share of top three banks´ assets 
of total banking sector assets from Beck et al. (2010) as the structure of the banking sector might 
affect lending. Finally, we use a dummy variable for common law legal origin, as legal origin has 
been shown to have an effect on financial development (La Porta et al. 1998). The data for the 
legal origin are from the CIA World Factbook (2012), which covers all the countries for which 
the rest of our data were available. Summary statistics for control variables are available in 
Appendix 2. 
. 
2.3.2 Models and results: piecewise linear regression 
Multivariate regression analysis with panel data presents some challenges for the choice of the 
estimators. We use both pooled and fixed effects5 estimators due to their different strengths. A 
pooled estimator takes into account all available information, but does not capture unobserved 
variables, whereas a fixed effects estimator controls for all time-constant variables, but is unable 
to estimate their specific contribution. Moreover, fixed effects estimators are inefficient for 
controlling slowly moving variables.(Wolf 2009)  
Pooled model can however be used only in non-dynamic approach. When we use lagged 
values of dependent variables in the right hand side in equation in chapter 2.3.2.4, the pooled 
model is inconsistent.  As the fixed effects estimator is in any case better suited to capture the 
uncontrolled country specific characteristics, we use the pooled model only for the preliminary 
estimations. 
Using fixed effects estimator in dynamic panel data models is also problematic. The 
demeaning process creates bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, 
                                                   
5 The fixed effects estimator was chosen over the random effects estimator by the Hausman test 
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which in not mitigated by increasing individual units N (Nickell 1981). Increasing the time 
dimension does reduce the bias, but as  Judson and Owen (1999) show, the bias still remains 
significant when T=20. In addition to fixed effects estimator, we thus use Anderson-Hsiao 
estimator to confirm the results. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest an approach, where they remove the fixed effect by first 
differencing the general equation 
itititit exyy ??? ? ?? 1 .     ( 1 ) 
As the first differenced errors )( 1?? itit ee  are correlated with the lagged first differenced 
independent variables, they recommend instrumenting for the )( 21 ?? ? itit yy  with either the level 
or the first difference of 2?ity . As the previous literature suggests that the lagged level is superior 
as an instrument (see e.g.Arellano, Bond 1991) we use only level as instrument in our estimations. 
According to simulations by   Judson and Owen (1999), Anderson-Hsiao estimator is well suited 
for unbalanced panels where time dimension is more than 10. Simulation study by Gaduh (2002) 
agues however, that despite being consistent, AH-estimator is inferior to fixed effects estimator 
due to its inefficiency. Only when time dimension is as short as 5 periods, there is a strong case 
of using AH estimator or generalized method of moments estimator over fixed effects with 
parameter assumptions of a typical growth regression. 
We use financial sector variables as dependent variables to determine whether the resource-
dependence has a significant effect on financial sector characteristics. Following Nili and Rastad 
(2007) we use mineral export share of total merchandise exports as a base indicator for resource 
dependence. However, non-manufacturing production (MQPROXY) and subsoil wealth 
(SUBSOIL) are also used for robustness checks. Subsoil assets is clearly a more exogenous 
variable, as it is difficult to argue that financial sector size or any other variables would have a 
significant effect on the resource endowments of the country. Moreover, the prices at which those 
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resources are valued are also determined exogenously by international markets, where individual 
countries have little or no effect. 
2.3.2.1 Locating the threshold  
While the correlation between domestic banking sector size (PCRED and M2) and resource-
dependence is negative and significant (table 1), it is not linear. Figure 1 plots the mineral export 
share and bank credit to the private sector. The smoothed line shows that, at very low mineral 
export share, the correlation is positive. This result is robust also to other indicators of resource 
dependence as well as to M2 as a banking sector indicator. 
Figure 1 Mineral export share of total exports and private credit to GDP 
 
Due to this property, we apply a piecewise linear regression to the data, following Hansen 
(1999). The general equation becomes 
itititititiit eqIxqIxy ?????? )()( 21 ?????    ( 2 ) 
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where ).(I is the indicator function, which equals 1 if true and 0 if false.  Thus, the observations 
are divided into two regimes by the threshold ? . The regimes are distinguished by different 
regression slopes 1?  and 2? . Here, the idea is that only the coefficient of the resource indicator 
switches when the regime changes, as it is the key variable of interest. 
Locating the threshold estimate and its confidence intervals from the scatterplot data depicted 
in Figure 1 was done by non-parametric methods by fitting a one knot degree one spline with 1000 
bootstrap replications to equation 
,)(1 ititiit emexportpcred ??? ??
    
( 3 ) 
Where pcredit equals logarithmic transformation of bank credit to private sector and mexportit 
equals the logarithmic transformation of mineral export share of total exports for country i in time 
t.  The threshold level seen in figure 1 was located at 806.1)log( ?MEXPORT?  with 95% confidence 
interval [1.617, 2.036]. We then test for the significance of the located threshold using analysis of 
variance, comparing the linear model in equation 3 and the following form of piecewise linear 
model: 
.)806.1(
)806.1()(
2
1
ititit
ititiit
emexportImexport
mexportImexportpcred
???
???
?
??
    ( 4 ) 
In equation 4, the coefficient for logarithmic transformation of mineral export share (mexportit) 
changes when threshold level of 1.806 is reached. F-statistic with the corresponding p-value in 
table 2 shows that the located threshold is very significant. 
As the estimated threshold level vs. M2 was also within that confidence interval, we use the 
same threshold level of mineral export share for both private credit and M26. But no clear 
threshold for market-based financial sector indicators was found. Even though the threshold used 
                                                   
6 Threshold for mexport when using M2 as independent variable was located at 1.626 and it was also 
found very significant 
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is reached already when about 6% of country’s exports are minerals, almost one third of the 
observations are still below that threshold level. Similarly, the threshold level where the 
correlation coefficient changes sign is found for MQPROXY when the non-manufacturing 
production share equals 41% of total industrial production. Logarithmic threshold estimates with 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals are reported in table 3. 
Table 2. Test for the significance of the located threshold 
 
 
Table 3 Threshold estimates for mineral export share of total exports and non-manufacturing production share of total 
industrial production 
 
 
2.3.2.2 Piecewise linear regression 
We can now apply the located threshold level to the equation 1. We first estimate the domestic 
banking sector indicator, namely private sector credit to GDP. We also include estimations of 
interest rate spread, which we use as an indicator of domestic banking sector quality. We expect 
these variables to show whether banking sector structure depends on a country’s resource 
dependence. The estimated equation for private credit as a dependent variable is of the following 
form:  
Test for the threshold level γ=1.806
F-statistic 90.03
P-value 0.000
Estimate 95% confidence interval Obs ≤ γ Obs > γ
1.806 [1.617, 2.036] 560 1132
3.712 [3.405, 3.776] 852 928
? ?? ?MQPROXYMEXPORT?
?
log
log
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where the indicator function ).(I equals 1 if the condition in the parenthesis is true and 0 if false. 
Sub index i refers to country and t to year. We use once lagged independent variables to reduce 
the risk of reverse causality. Only the index of economic freedom is not lagged further, as the 
index for each year is collected the previous year. 
Second, we include other financial sector indicators, namely stock market capitalization, 
international debt issues and loans from non-resident banks, to estimate whether the roles of 
capital markets and foreign banks depend on a country’s resource dependence. We also conduct 
dynamic analysis as well as several robustness checks to confirm the results. 
2.3.2.3 Non-dynamic results 
The existence of the threshold where coefficient of resource dependence  as explanatory variable 
for financial sector development changes from positive to negative is an interesting result itself. 
That is to say that at low levels of resource dependence the relation is more intuitive, as natural 
resources wealth as any other wealth is assumed to support the financial sector development. Yet, 
at very low levels of resource dependence, when the share of mineral exports reaches 6% of total 
exports or non-manufacturing production share 41% of total industrial production, it appears that 
resources become a drag on financial development. Interestingly, the result seems to hold when 
extensive range of control variables is included in the regression. However, country fixed effects 
seem to control for this as the within estimator is negative and significant already at low levels of 
resource dependence. 
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Table 4 reports the regression results for credit to the private sector and stock market 
capitalization. The results for private credit are broadly in line with the preliminary study by Beck 
(2011).  The high mineral export share of total exports explains the lower level of bank credit to 
the private sector in sample countries. In particular, the pooled estimator shows that the coefficient 
of mineral export share changes from small positive but insignificant to very significant negative 
as the threshold level is reached. Moreover, the result is not only statistically, but economically 
significant. An average country has mineral export share of 27% (table 1). An increase in export 
share by 10 percentage points to 37% would imply a drop of 3% in the share of private credit to 
GDP.  Country fixed effects seem to capture the positive correlation between private credit and 
mineral export share at low levels of mineral exports, as the coefficient is negative and significant 
when the mineral export share of total exports is below the 6.1% threshold.  On the contrary, stock 
market capitalization seems to be positively associated with high mineral export share. 
Control variables are mostly as expected and also in line with previous studies. Index of 
economic freedom, secondary school enrollment, foreign direct investment and income level are 
positively correlated with financial sector size, when significant; whereas high inflation seems to 
hamper both banking sector and equity markets. High bank concentration seems to be associated 
with a smaller banking sector. Legal background as a binary and time-invariant variable appears 
only in the pooled model, but accords with previous literature in that common law legal origin 
seems to create a more favorable environment for financial sector development than do other legal 
backgrounds.  
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Table 4. Non-dynamic regression results for key variables 
 
Appendix 3 confirms the regression results by using three other dependent variables, namely 
international debt issues, loans from non-resident banks and interest rate spread. International debt 
issues seem to be higher in countries with high mineral export share of total exports. When 
explaining the interest rate spread, the coefficient for mineral export share is insignificant, so we 
find no evidence that the smaller domestic banking sector in resource dependent countries would 
be due to low quality of financial intermediation. For all of these variables, the number of 
observations is clearly smaller than with estimations on private credit. 
Pooled estimator Within estimator
pcred stmktcap pcred stmktcap
mexport> 6.1% (lag1) -0.104 0.011 *** 0.004 0.016
mexport≤ 6.1% (lag1) 0.021 0.023 -0.059 0.015 ***
mexport (lag1) 0.055 0.021 *** 0.074 0.042 *
econf 0.694 0.174 *** -0.313 0.296 1.222 0.132 *** 0.705 0.261 ***
cpiyy (lag1) -0.431 0.046 *** -0.617 0.085 *** -0.090 0.023 *** -0.069 0.057
school (lag1) 0.297 0.048 *** 0.058 0.124 0.083 0.064 0.145 0.172
gdp/cap (lag1) 0.249 0.023 *** 0.431 0.038 *** 1.100 0.084 *** 1.307 0.176 ***
gdpgrowth (lag1) -0.266 0.164 -0.817 0.276 *** -0.013 0.075 -0.025 0.143
concentration (lag1) -0.224 0.056 *** -0.021 0.085 -0.124 0.050 ** -0.064 0.090
FDI (lag1) 0.011 0.098 0.054 0.179 0.117 0.045 *** 0.399 0.103 ***
GSCI (lag1) 0.227 0.050 *** 0.602 0.071 *** 0.014 0.031 0.376 0.059 ***
legal 0.290 0.053 *** 0.827 0.080 ***
Obs. 1142 899 1142 899
R 2 0.58 0.51 0.49 0.47
Standard errors are next to coefficients in italics. Significance level for 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, ** and ***
respectively. Logarithmic transformations are used for both dependent and independent variables. Dependent variables:
“pcred”: commercial banks’ credit to private sector to GDP (%); “stmktcap”: stock market capitalization to GDP (%).
Independent variables: “mexport”: mineral exports share of total merchandise exports (%); “econf”: index of economic
freedom;”cpiyy”: consumer price inflation, year-on-year change (%);” school”: gross secondary school enrollment (%);
“gdp/cap”: per capita GDP (USD); “gdpgrowth”: GDP growth rate, year-on-year (%); “concentration”: assets of top 3
banks of total bank assets; “FDI”: foreign direct investment inflow to GDP (%); “GSCI”: Goldman Sachs Commodity Index;
“legal”: binary variable for legal origin with 1=common law, 0=other. Country specific dummy variables were included but
not reported.
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2.3.2.4 Dynamic results 
Financial sector variables are likely to be persistent and typical business cycle might cause some 
of the effects observed in the first estimations. We now control for the business cycle component 
by using first and second lags of dependent variables as explanatory variables.  The equation 5 
now becomes: 
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In addition to fixed effect estimator, we now use Anderson-Hsiao estimator (subsequently termed 
the AH estimator) to confirm the results. Here, we use only once lagged dependent variable in the 
right hand side of the equation and instrument it with the second lag level. 
Table 5 presents dynamic regression results for private credit and stock market capitalization 
as the dependent variables. When explaining the private credit to GDP, the coefficient for mineral 
export share of total exports is negative when significant, so well in line with the preliminary 
results. The results by the AH estimator are somewhat surprising, as the coefficients of the lagged 
value of the dependent variables are low and not even significant for the stock market 
capitalization as the dependent variable.   
The results from both the within estimator and AH estimator confirm our hypothesis and the 
first results from chapter 2.3.2.3, that market-based finance is likely to play a bigger role in 
resource dependent economies. Although Beck (2011) failed to find significant coefficient for 
resource dependence with stock market capitalization as the dependent variable, his result of more 
market based financial systems in resource dependent economies is in line with our result. 
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Table 5. Dynamic estimations for private credit and stock market capitalization as the dependent variables 
 
  
Within estimator AH-estimator
pcred stmktcap pcred stmktcap
dependent (lag1) 0.810 0.030 *** 1.177 0.033 *** 0.320 0.161 ** -0.006 0.084
dependent(lag2) -0.065 0.029 ** -0.466 0.030 ***
mexport> 6.1% (lag1) -0.010 0.010 0.012 0.011
mexport≤ 6.1% (lag1) -0.019 0.009 ** 0.007 0.011
mexport 0.051 0.024 ** 0.073 0.030 **
econf 0.185 0.086 ** 0.073 0.148 0.177 0.136 -0.033 0.244
cpiyy (lag1) -0.088 0.015 *** -0.019 0.032 -0.086 0.014 *** -0.063 0.046
school (lag1) 0.007 0.040 0.243 0.098 ** -0.024 0.076 0.130 0.197
gdp/cap (lag1) 0.211 0.058 *** 0.573 0.109 *** 0.719 0.244 *** 1.861 0.282 ***
gdpgrowth (lag1) 0.140 0.047 ** -0.185 0.082 ** 0.021 0.057 -0.299 0.083 ***
concentration (lag1) -0.039 0.031 -0.049 0.051 -0.047 0.042 -0.004 0.084
FDI (lag1) 0.035 0.027 0.014 0.057 0.028 0.028 0.143 0.060 **
GSCI (lag1) 0.047 0.019 ** 0.068 0.034 ** 0.082 0.030 *** 0.148 0.061 **
Obs. Used 1091 822 1091 822
R 2 0.814 0.846
Standard errors are next to coefficients in italics. Significance level for 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, ** and 
*** respectively. Logarithmic transformations are used for both dependent and independent variables. Dependent 
variables: “pcred”: commercial banks’ credit to private sector to GDP (%); ”stmktcap”: stock market capitalization 
to GDP (%). Independent variables: “mexport”: mineral exports share of total merchandise exports (%); “econf”: 
index of economic freedom;”cpiyy”: consumer price inflation, year-on-year change (%);” school”: gross secondary 
school enrollment (%); “gdp/cap”: per capita GDP (USD); “gdpgrowth”: GDP growth rate, year-on-year 
(%);“concentration”: assets of top 3 banks of total bank assets; “FDI”: foreign direct investment inflow to GDP (%); 
“GSCI”: Goldman Sachs Commodity Index. Country specific dummy variables were included in the within model, but 
not reported. Anderson-Hsiao estimator with second lag of the dependent variable as the instrument
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The previous results on the domestic banking sector are not as strong if we use liquid 
liabilities (M2) as the dependent variable (Appendix 4). Thus, when the public sector is 
accounted for in the banking sector size measure, we find no evidence that resource dependence 
has a dampening effect on the banking sector in resource-rich countries. The low level of bank 
lending to private sector might be explained by a smaller private sector.  
All in all, the introduction of business cycle component using lagged values of the dependent 
variable in the right had side of the equation does capture a big part of the relationship between 
resource dependence and financial sector detected in the first non-dynamic estimations, but it does 
not fully eliminate the effect. According to our estimations, high level of resource dependence 
hampers private credit in the domestic banking sector and supports market-based financing.  It 
appears that the financial sector structure in resource-dependent economies indeed serves well the 
financial needs of big well-known firms. That is, domestic bank loans are less common, whereas 
the use of stock markets is more common. However, that results in an especially challenging 
environment for small and medium size enterprises as well as for emerging businesses, which are 
known to be more dependent on domestic banks. We thus suggest that financial sector structure 
is likely to constrain economic diversification in resource-dependent economies. 
 
2.3.2.5 Robustness checks 
Cross-country regressions always pose several challenges. The first is obviously country 
heterogeneity, which is difficult to fully capture by estimators. In particular, correlations tend to 
be kinked at the extreme ends of the income distribution. We now repeat the estimations removing 
high income countries based on the World Bank income rank in 1995. Limiting the data to low 
and middle income countries reduces the outlier problem, as some rich countries have extremely 
large banking sectors. The sample of low and middle income countries includes 104 countries. 
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Regression results are reported in Table 6. The results are mostly unaltered. Resource export 
share is negatively correlated with bank lending to private sector. For low and middle income 
countries, the threshold where correlation between mineral export share and private credit turns 
negative when mineral exports account for 15% of total exports in the country (Appendix 5), so 
the threshold level is slightly higher than when rich countries were included. Again, the country 
fixed effects seem to control for this phenomenon. We find no significant coefficient for the 
resource dependence with the AH-estimator in explaining private credit. Also in line with earlier 
regressions, stock market capitalization seems to be higher in resource-dependent countries 
according to both within and AH-estimator. 
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Table 6. Regressions repeated with low and middle-income economies 
 
 
Measures of resource-dependence are often criticized when used in identifying the resource 
curse. There is a risk that resource-dependence is endogenous to the level of economic 
development (e.g. Frankel 2010). However, the level of overall economic development is 
controlled for in our regressions by GDP level.  Nevertheless, we have other indicators of resource 
dependence as described in chapter 2.3.1. First, we use the non-manufacturing share of industrial 
production as the independent variable in explaining the financial sector variables. Results are 
depicted in Table 7.  Again, the regression results for credit to private sector seem robust to earlier 
results. The coefficients for low and high level of resource dependence are very similar, but always 
Within estimator AH-estimator
pcred stmktcap pcred stmktcap
dependent (lag1) 0.854 0.032 *** 1.156 0.037 *** 0.261 0.123 ** 0.029 0.093
dependent(lag2) -0.095 0.031 *** -0.436 0.034 ***
mexport> 15% (lag1) -0.015 0.009 * 0.012 0.009
mexport≤ 15% (lag1) -0.013 0.009 0.004 0.009
mexport (lag1) 0.068 0.026 ** 0.067 0.032 **
econf 0.195 0.086 ** 0.248 0.168 0.212 0.120 * 0.164 0.264
cpiyy (lag1) -0.090 0.014 *** -0.004 0.035 -0.085 0.013 *** -0.058 0.048
school (lag1) -0.001 0.042 0.261 0.120 ** 0.024 0.070 0.193 0.217
gdp/cap (lag1) 0.177 0.058 *** 0.522 0.126 *** 0.826 0.199 *** 1.784 0.309 ***
gdpgrowth (lag1) 0.153 0.047 *** -0.143 0.092 0.013 0.050 -0.287 0.091 ***
concentration (lag1) -0.024 0.032 -0.065 0.058 -0.058 0.040 -0.051 0.092
FDI (lag1) 0.033 0.028 0.016 0.067 0.055 0.027 ** 0.125 0.069 *
GSCI (lag1) 0.058 0.021 *** 0.076 0.046 0.065 0.029 ** 0.176 0.072 **
Obs. Used 940 646 940 646
R 2 0.84 0.85
Standard errors are next to coefficients in italics. Significance level for 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, ** and 
*** respectively. Logarithmic transformations are used for both dependent and independent variables. Dependent 
variables: “pcred”: commercial banks’ credit to private sector to GDP (%);“stmktcap”: stock market capitalization 
to GDP (%). Independent variables: “mexport”: mineral exports share of total merchandise exports (%); “econf”: 
index of economic freedom;”cpiyy”: consumer price inflation, year-on-year change (%);” school”: gross secondary 
school enrollment (%); “gdp/cap”: per capita GDP (USD); “gdpgrowth”: GDP growth rate, year-on-year 
(%);“concentration”: assets of top 3 banks of total bank assets; “FDI”: foreign direct investment inflow to GDP (%); 
“GSCI”: Goldman Sachs Commodity Index. Country specific dummy variables were included in the within model, but 
not reported. Anderson-Hsiao estimator with second lag of the dependent variable as the instrument.
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negative and significant, so it appears that in countries with high non-manufacturing production 
share of industrial production, the bank lending to private sector is lower relative to GDP. 
 
Table 7 Regressions repeated with non-manufacturing production share as the resource indicator 
 
 
  
Within estimator AH-estimator
pcred pcred
dependent (lag1) 0.825 0.031 *** 0.348 0.153 **
dependent (lag2) -0.066 0.030 **
mqproxy> 41% (lag1) -0.086 0.043 ** -0.042 0.049
mqproxy≤ 41% (lag1) -0.091 0.045 ** -0.044 0.051
econf 0.182 0.089 ** 0.173 0.139
cpiyy (lag1) -0.084 0.014 *** -0.087 0.014 ***
school (lag1) 0.000 0.043 0.038 0.082
gdp/cap (lag1) 0.176 0.060 *** 0.525 0.225 **
gdpgrowth (lag1) 0.125 0.048 *** 0.045 0.059
concentration (lag1) -0.040 0.033 -0.061 0.045
FDI (lag1) 0.035 0.030 0.042 0.035
GSCI (lag1) 0.052 0.020 ** 0.084 0.031 ***
Obs. 1068 1068
R 2 0.71
Standard errors are next to coefficients in italics. Significance level for 10%, 5%, and 1%
are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Logarithmic transformations are used for both 
dependent and independent variables. Dependent variable: “pcred”: commercial banks’
credit to private sector to GDP (%). Independent variables: “mqproxy”: non-
manufacturing production share of total industrial production (%); “econf”: index of
economic freedom;”cpiyy”: consumer price inflation, year-on-year change (%);”
school”: gross secondary school enrollment (%); “gdp/cap”: per capita GDP (USD);
“gdpgrowth”: GDP growth rate, year-on-year (%);“concentration”: assets of top 3
banks of total bank assets; “FDI”: foreign direct investment inflow to GDP (%);
“GSCI”: Goldman Sachs Commodity Index. Country specific dummy variables were
included in the within model, but not reported. Anderson-Hsiao estimator with second lag
of the dependent variable as the instrument.
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Reverse causality cannot totally be ruled out in these regressions, even though we use once 
lagged independent variables. However, we do have a good exogenous variable for resource 
wealth, subsoil assets, which can be used at least as a strong argument that financial sector 
structure yields from the endowment structure, not the other way around. However, as we have 
only one observation for subsoil assets, we calculate country averages. The results are depicted in 
Table 8. Again the results seem very robust for private credit, so that a higher ratio of subsoil 
assets to GDP pairs with a lower level of credit to the private sector. However, we fail to find a 
significant coefficient for resource-dependence when stock market capitalization is the dependent 
variable. 
Omitted variable bias is tackled by using the fixed effects estimator but obviously remains 
present. Risk of spurious regression, though existent, is not severe in our view, given that 
resources must be considered an initial endowment. Of course, resources are valued with market 
prices, which are often driven by benign global economic developments.  Strong global growth is 
likely to support most countries’ growth and thus financial sector development. However, we 
control for both resource prices business cycle and GDP growth in our regressions. 
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Table 8. Regression results for country averages 
 
2.4 Interpretation of the results 
Very little research has been done on the link between financial sector and natural resources. Most 
microeconomic studies on financial needs of firms concentrate on the manufacturing sector (e.g.  
Cetorelli and Gambera 2001, Rajan and Zingales 1998)). Moreover, while macroeconomic 
research on resource-dependent economies is extensive, it is focused more on economic growth. 
Thus, there are plenty of open issues related to financial sector’s role in resource-dependent 
economies. Here we suggest three alternative hypotheses on why the financial sector has the above 
described characteristics in resource-dependent economies. 
OLS Estimator for country averages
dependent variable is pcred dependent variable is stmktcap
independent variables Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
subsoil assets -0.071 0.029 ** 0.084 0.055
econf 0.277 0.617 0.908 1.340
cpiyy -0.621 0.197 *** 0.522 0.476
school 0.528 0.154 *** 0.381 0.438
gdp/cap 0.231 0.076 *** 0.136 0.156
gdpgrowth -0.327 1.014 -5.528 2.301 *
fdi -0.793 0.433 * -1.027 0.953
legal 0.279 0.156 * 0.408 0.281
M2 1.250 0.245 ***
Obs. 112 82
R 2 0.66 0.59
Significance level for 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Logarithmic
transformations are used for both dependent and independent variables. Dependent variables: “pcred”:
commercial banks’ credit to private sector to GDP (%), country average for 1995-2009;“stmktcap”:
stock market capitalization to GDP (%)country average for 1995-2009. Independent variables:
“subsoil”: subsoil assets in 2000 to GDP; “econf”: index of economic freedom, country average for
1995-2009; ”cpiyy”: consumer price inflation, year-on-year change (%),country average for 1995-2009;
” school”: gross secondary school enrollment (%, )country average for 1995-2009; “gdp/cap”: per
capita GDP (USD), country average for 1995-2009; “gdpgrowth”: GDP growth rate, year-on-year
(%),country average for 1995-2009; “fdi”: foreign direct investment inflow to GDP (%),country
average for 1995-2009 ; “legal”: binary variable for legal origin with 1=common law, 0=other; “M2”:
money supply (M2) to GDP(%)
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2.4.1 Demand hypothesis 
The most obvious reason for an underdeveloped banking sector in resource-dependent economies 
is based on a low level of demand for banking services by resource firms. However, as there has 
been very little empirical work done on financial needs of big resource firms, this hypothesis 
remains for future research. 
Resource firms tend to be big compared to the size of the economy in developing economies 
in particular. Again, very little academic research has been done on this rather intuitive issue, but 
some evidence can be presented by using Forbes Global 2000 list of the biggest public enterprises 
in the world. Limiting the sample to non-financial firms, the list includes 1431 firms. Further, 203 
of those firms or 14% are mineral production firms. When the analysis is limited to the biggest 
300 firms or 209 biggest non-financial firms, the share of mineral production companies is already 
20%. When removing the companies based in rich countries by the World Bank classification, the 
percentage share of mineral producing companies is 23% for the full sample and 74% of the 
sample including the biggest 300 firms globally. Thus, it seems to be the case, that in particular 
in developing economies, the biggest companies are mineral production firms.  
When resource firms invest, their investments can easily be big relative to the banking sector 
size especially in developing economies due to bulkiness of investments (Berglof, Lehmann 
2009). Thus, bank-based finance might be difficult to obtain, as banks might find it difficult to 
sufficiently diversify their loan portfolios. Due to their size however, resource firms achieve 
economies of scale in market-based finance (Lin et al. 2009), which would explain the use of 
equity and debt markets. Firm size also helps in the capital markets due to the fact that big resource 
firms tend to be well known by international investors. Government involvement might also have 
an effect on financial sector structure. As government ownership often plays a big role in the 
resource sector (Wolf 2009), resource firms are likely to have better access to international capital 
markets. 
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An interesting implication of this theory is the low level of economic diversification in 
resource-dependent countries. That is, as Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue, a developed banking 
sector enhances the development of industries that require a great deal of external funding. These 
industries tend to be high value added manufacturing sectors such as pharmaceuticals and IT, that 
is, exactly those industries that would support economic diversification in resource-dependent 
economies. Following the reasoning by Lin et al. (2009), a financial sector built on the needs of 
big firms tends not to serve smaller firms well. That is likely to further deter the development of 
the vital SME sector. 
The shortcoming of this demand theory is that the financial sector tends to be subject to 
significant regulation, especially in developing economies. Typically, there is regulation on 
capital requirements and other risk monitoring for banks. Also, regulation of entry is not 
uncommon (Rajan, Zingales 2003a). Thus, we are not convinced that financial markets are formed 
solely to meet market-determined demand. The financial sector continues to gather substantial 
political attention even in the most developed countries, so that undistracted development of 
financial markets in developing economies seems rather unrealistic. 
2.4.2 Interest group hypothesis 
Rajan and Zingales (2003b) present an interest group theory on financial sector development 
according to which incumbents in different sectors might want to thwart financial sector 
development because finance disproportionally supports new entrants and thus spurs competition. 
However, trade openness reduces incumbent opposition to financial development, as expanding 
product markets add to incumbents’ own funding needs.  
Although the interest group theory was not originally designed to describe the behavior of the 
resource sector, we find this theory useful for analyzing resource-dependent economies. 
Interestingly, the resource sector is not likely to push for economic developments that are typically 
needed by the manufacturing sector. Following the reasoning by Rajan and Zingales (2003b), 
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resource-rich countries are likely to have a strong elite built around the resources, which has very 
little interest in developing the country so as to favor the manufacturing sector. The resource sector 
does not need masses of educated labor force or immaterial property rights, as the sector typically 
does not actively pursue innovation. The elite with access to resource rents have much influence 
over politicians or are directly involved in politics and have thus no interest in promoting a more 
democratic state. The legal environment is also of little importance, as once again the elite have 
sufficient power to advance their own interests, which is perhaps even easier to do with a weaker 
rule of law.  Public protection of property rights is not necessary, as it can be replaced by private 
protection of property rights (Sonin, 2003). Market conditions are mostly determined 
exogenously, as the resource sector is highly dependent on global commodity prices. 
The threat to the resource elite lies in the fact that it does not require much special knowledge 
to manage resources. Thus, the incumbents in the resource sector can be displaced at any time, if 
entrants gain sufficient political and financial power. As Rajan and Zingales (2003a) argue, the 
financial sector is a significant factor in supporting entrants, thus the development of the financial 
sector actually creates a threat to incumbents in the resource sector. Moreover, trade openness 
rarely changes the situation, as international trade barriers usually do not concern minerals, at 
least not energy products. Moreover, firms in resource sector tend to be big and well-known and 
thus have access to global financial markets. 
Thus, in addition to the fact that the resource sector does not need domestic banking services, 
it is reasonable to assume that it does not even want a highly developed domestic financial sector. 
This theory would also extend the grabbing hand theory introduced by Frye and Shleifer (1997). 
Perhaps not only government, but also an influential group of resource sector firm managers will 
have little interest in supporting law enforcement.  
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2.4.3 Volatility hypothesis 
Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) suggest that volatility is an important but overlooked channel 
of the resource curse. Although macroeconomic volatility is likely to dampen growth through 
several channels, it is probably also a factor behind underdevelopment of the financial sector in 
resource-dependent economies. Boyd et al. (2001) provide empirical evidence that even 
predictable increases in the inflation rate produce disturbances in the financial sector.  Similarly, 
volatility of GDP growth, terms-of-trade and the real exchange rate, caused by significant 
uncertainty related to commodities prices, could deter financial sector development. 
Berglof and Lehmann (2009) note that resource-dependent economies tend to suffer from the 
bulkiness of investments and thus lack more sustainable demand for financial services. Roe and 
Siegel (2011) argue that political instability is another major obstacle for financial sector 
development. Especially in early stages of development, resource-rich countries tend to be 
particularly vulnerable to political instability. Preliminary study by Hattendorff (2014) shows that 
export concentration is harmful for banking sector development. 
Aghion et al. (2004) use an open economy model to show that countries with intermediate 
levels of financial development are likely to suffer most from macroeconomic volatility as well 
as from capital account liberalization. As resource dependent economies7 are scarce among the 
financially developed countries, they are likely to be vulnerable to macroeconomic volatility. 
However, the causality remains subject to debate, as Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) 
show that financially underdeveloped countries are likely to suffer from higher volatility, whereas 
                                                   
7 Resource-dependent countries here are countries where mineral export share of total exports is greater than 40% 
on average in 1995-2009.Those countries in our sample include Algeria, Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Chile, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 
Libya, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia.   
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many studies (e.g., Boyd et al., 2001) suggest that the financial sector is not likely to develop in a 
volatile environment. However, as the main source of volatility in resource dependent economies 
is commodity prices, which are exogenous, we expect commodity price volatility to cause the 
overall volatility in these economies. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This paper presents empirical evidence on the previously neglected question of how resource 
wealth affects a country’s financial sector structure and suggests that the banking sector 
characteristics might be one of the factors reinforcing the resource curse. 
Using an extensive dataset covering 128 countries, we present empirical evidence that the 
banking sector indeed tends to be smaller in resource-dependent economies, even when 
controlling for several other factors which have been shown to have a significant effect on 
financial sector development in previous studies. Intuition says that resource wealth, like any other 
wealth, should be benign for financial development.  Indeed, that seems to be the case at very low 
levels of resource dependence. We locate a threshold where the country’s mineral exports account 
for about 6% of total exports. With export dependence on minerals above the threshold level, 
correlation between resource export share and domestic banking sector size turns negative. This 
phenomenon however, is captured by country fixed effects. 
Evidence for a smaller role of domestic credit to private sector and higher stock market 
capitalization in resource dependent economies is strong, as it is confirmed by several estimation 
techniques and different indicators of resource dependence. 
There are several possible reasons for the underdevelopment of domestic banking sector and 
bigger role of market-based finance. Theoretically, a country’s production structure is formed on 
the basis of its initial endowments, that is, labor, capital and natural resource wealth. Thereupon, 
the financial sector is formed on the basis of the needs of the production sector. According to 
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previous literature, big firms are likely to be best served by big banks or by capital markets, as 
their financing needs can be large relative to domestic bank assets, especially in developing 
economies. The literature also suggests that macroeconomic volatility due to volatile resource 
prices is likely to hamper domestic banking sector development. Thus, our results are well in line 
with the previous literature. 
We suggest three alternative hypotheses for the low level of financial sector development in 
resource-dependent economies. First, demand hypothesis is based on the assumption that the 
financial sector is formed according to the needs of the most prominent sector of the economy, 
the resource sector. Second, interest group hypothesis assumes more imperfect markets, with 
strong elite hampering the financial sector development to prevent increasing competition. Third, 
we present volatility hypothesis, which suggests that the macroeconomic volatility caused by 
cyclical raw materials prices might deter financial sector development. 
Whatever the reason behind the financial development in resource-dependent economies, the 
financial sectors in those countries seem to have characteristics that are unfavorable to small and 
medium size enterprises and emerging businesses, which tend to be more dependent on the 
domestic banking lending than are the bigger and more mature firms. Consequently, we argue that 
financial sector development based on large resource endowments might play a role in the 
resource curse. A financial sector that is structured to serve large firms is perhaps unable to serve 
emerging sectors of the economy and thus restrains economic diversification. 
However, very little research has been done on the financial sector’s role in resource-
dependent economies. Both determinants of observed financial sector development and the effect 
of financial structure for future economic development remain open for study.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Sample countries and their sample means for mineral exports and private credit 
 
Country
Mineral export share 
of total exports, %
Bank credit to private 
sector/GDP, %
1 Algeria 97.1 8.9
2 Angola 98.5 6.6
3 Argentina 16.6 17.3
4 Armenia 28.6 8.6
5 Australia 43.2 96.3
6 Azerbaijan 82.7 7.2
7 Bahrain 85.6 67.6
8 Bangladesh 0.6 28.8
9 Belarus 26.2 13.4
10 Belize 16.7 54.8
11 Benin 1.4 13.4
12 Bolivia 53.3 49.7
13 Botswana 84.2 15.7
14 Brazil 14.2 37.0
15 Bulgaria 22.4 34.1
16 Burkina Faso 0.9 13.2
17 Burundi 3.9 22.8
18 Cambodia 0.5 8.8
19 Cameroon 51.6 8.8
20 Canada 22.2 135.9
21 Cape Verde 0.2 41.7
22 Central African Republic 21.5 5.6
23 Chile 51.2 76.1
24 China 4.5 109.5
25 Colombia 39.4 29.9
26 Congo, Rep. 86.9 5.3
27 Costa Rica 1.6 27.9
28 Croatia 13.8 42.8
29 Cyprus 8.7 120.5
30 Czech Republic 5.2 49.3
31 Denmark 7.6 97.2
32 Djibouti 6.8 30.6
33 Dominican Republic 4.1 31.4
34 Ecuador 45.1 26.0
35 Egypt, Arab Rep. 47.4 53.2
36 El Salvador 4.4 41.3
37 Estonia 10.6 50.7
38 Ethiopia 1.4 19.6
39 Fiji 0.8 35.5
40 Gabon 84.8 9.6
41 Gambia, The 2.5 13.4
42 Georgia 27.5 11.9
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Country
Mineral export share 
of total exports, %
Bank credit to private 
sector/GDP, %
43 Ghana 34.7 11.4
44 Guatemala 7.0 23.0
45 Guinea 70.8 4.0
46 Guinea-Bissau 0.5 5.9
47 Guyana 37.1 53.9
48 Honduras 6.5 38.2
49 Hungary 4.4 38.9
50 Iceland 21.2 89.6
51 India 11.5 33.6
52 Indonesia 32.1 32.7
53 Iran, Islamic Rep. 83.0 34.9
54 Israel 1.6 80.5
55 Jamaica 13.2 21.9
56 Japan 2.4 195.7
57 Jordan 17.6 79.2
58 Kazakhstan 71.8 22.8
59 Kenya 12.3 28.3
60 Korea, Rep. 6.5 89.0
61 Kuwait 91.7 57.8
62 Kyrgyz Republic 21.1 7.1
63 Latvia 6.7 40.0
64 Lebanon 10.1 63.9
65 Lesotho 0.1 13.7
66 Libya 93.7 20.4
67 Lithuania 21.6 26.5
68 Macedonia, FYR 10.7 24.7
69 Madagascar 7.7 9.6
70 Malawi 0.4 7.8
71 Malaysia 11.9 126.7
72 Mali 2.7 16.8
73 Malta 1.2 108.4
74 Mauritania 60.2 21.2
75 Mauritius 0.5 63.4
76 Mexico 13.4 20.0
77 Moldova 3.3 18.4
78 Mongolia 54.8 20.5
79 Morocco 12.4 54.6
80 Mozambique 47.1 12.9
81 Namibia 49.1 46.2
82 Nepal 1.5 29.1
83 New Zealand 7.5 117.2
84 Nicaragua 2.1 27.5
85 Niger 59.3 6.3
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Country
Mineral export share 
of total exports, %
Bank credit to private 
sector/GDP, %
86 Nigeria 96.2 15.0
87 Norway 66.4 78.9
88 Oman 83.0 35.8
89 Pakistan 3.0 25.4
90 Panama 6.0 88.3
91 Paraguay 0.7 25.4
92 Peru 58.1 22.6
93 Philippines 4.6 41.6
94 Poland 10.1 28.1
95 Qatar 89.1 33.8
96 Romania 11.8 15.3
97 Russian Federation 61.5 20.6
98 Rwanda 26.7 9.7
99 Samoa 0.5 32.7
100 Saudi Arabia 89.6 54.9
101 Senegal 24.7 19.2
102 Slovak Republic 8.6 42.4
103 Slovenia 5.6 38.8
104 South Africa 28.8 132.2
105 Sri Lanka 1.9 30.1
106 Sudan 53.4 5.7
107 Suriname 10.8 16.7
108 Swaziland 1.1 16.7
109 Sweden 6.6 100.0
110 Switzerland 4.9 162.2
111 Syrian Arab Republic 63.6 11.1
112 Tajikistan 69.7 16.9
113 Tanzania 11.1 8.1
114 Thailand 4.2 119.5
115 Togo 23.5 17.3
116 Trinidad and Tobago 61.1 37.3
117 Tunisia 12.4 65.9
118 Turkey 5.2 21.4
119 Uganda 4.0 7.7
120 Ukraine 14.7 23.0
121 United Arab Emirates 79.8 58.2
122 United States 5.4 170.7
123 Uruguay 2.7 35.4
124 Venezuela, RB 87.5 13.9
125 Vietnam 22.3 51.0
126 Yemen, Rep. 94.1 6.0
127 Zambia 76.5 8.7
128 Zimbabwe 20.2 30.6
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Appendix 4. Estimations for liquid liabilities to GDP as the dependent variable 
 
 
Appendix 5. Threshold where mineral export share of total exports begins to be harmful for bank credit to private 
sector for low and middle income countries 
 
  
Within estimator AH-estimator
M2 M2
dependent (lag1) 1.015 0.031 *** 0.206 0.073 ***
dependent (lag2) -0.236 0.030 ***
mexport> 6.1% (lag1) -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.006
mexport≤ 6.1% (lag1) -0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.006
econf 0.123 0.044 *** 0.148 0.062 **
cpiyy (lag1) -0.015 0.008 * -0.014 0.007 *
school (lag1) 0.010 0.022 0.026 0.042
gdp/cap (lag1) 0.070 0.030 ** 0.436 0.074 ***
gdpgrowth (lag1) 0.013 0.025 -0.048 0.024 **
concentration (lag1) -0.048 0.016 *** 0.000 0.023
FDI (lag1) 0.007 0.015 0.018 0.015
GSCI (lag1) 0.033 0.010 *** 0.049 0.016 ***
Obs. Used 1084 1084
R 2 0.84
Standard errors are next to coefficients in italics. Significance level for 10%, 5%, and 1% are
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. Logarithmic transformations are used for both
dependent and independent variables. Dependent variable: “M2”: ratio of money supply (M2)  
o GDP (%). Independent variables: “mexport”: mineral exports share of total merchandise
exports (%); “econf”: index of economic freedom;”cpiyy”: consumer price inflation, year-on-
year change (%);” school”: gross secondary school enrollment (%); “gdp/cap”: per capita
GDP (USD); “gdpgrowth”: GDP growth rate, year-on-year (%); “concentration”: assets of
top 3 banks of total bank assets; “FDI”: foreign direct investment inflow to GDP (%);
“GSCI”: Goldman Sachs Commodity Index. Country specific dummy variables were included
in the within model, but not reported. Anderson-Hsiao estimator with second lag of the
dependent variable as the instrument
Estimate 95% confidence interval Obs ≤ γ Obs > γ
2.703 [1.786, 3.839] 771 668
Test for the threshold level γ=2.038
F-statistic 68.811
P-value 0.000
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3 Natural resources and capital structure 
 
3.1 Introduction8 
In countries highly dependent on their mineral resource sectors, the observed lackluster 
economic development is sometimes characterized as a resource curse. Several factors which 
are known to be harmful for economic development, such as a lower level of education and 
poor governance, have been shown to be present in resource-dependent countries. It is not 
clear, however, whether a resource curse is merely the natural outcome of organizing an 
economy around its resource sector based on a country’s factor endowments. If the resource 
industry does not need a particularly well educated labor force or a highly developed legal 
system, it is not surprising that those areas do not develop in countries with a large resource 
sector. 
In this paper, we consider the link between resource sector and finance. Given the 
dominance of the resource sector in “cursed” countries, we presume that financial institutions 
there are focused on meeting the needs of the resource sector. Kurronen (2015) notes that 
resource-dependent economies tend to extend less domestic credit to the private sector and 
rely more heavily on market-based financial instruments than their non-resource-dependent 
counterparts. Here, we extend the discussion to firm level and consider how capital structure 
of a firm differs from other firms when it operates directly in the resource sector or otherwise 
happens to be located in a resource-dependent country. 
                                                   
8 Older version of this chapter has been published as a BOFIT discussion paper No 10/2016 
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Following the reasoning of Lin, Sun & Jiang (2009), we argue that the production structure 
of a country is based on its factor endowments and its financial sector is based on the 
production structure. Our hypothesis is that financial sectors in resource-dependent countries 
are geared to serving large, well-known resource firms with considerable tangible assets. 
These conditions result in a financial infrastructure that may be challenging for small firms 
and emerging industries. We test our hypothesis using an extensive micro-level dataset 
containing financial data for listed firms in 70 countries. Listed firms in g eneral are larger on 
average than non-listed firms and enjoy easier access to external finance (Baum et al., 2011).  
We contribute to the existing literature in two ways. First, we consider how the capital 
structure of a resource firm might differ from firms in other sectors. We present empirical 
evidence covering a wide range of countries that suggest resource firms tend to have less debt 
than other non-financial firms and that that debt has a longer maturity. Second, we show that 
other firms in resource-dependent countries are less indebted than their counterparts in other 
countries. For this reason, we argue that mere location in a resource-dependent country is a 
country-specific determinant of firm capital structure.  
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 introduces the related 
literature. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
3.2 Capital structure of resource firms 
Contrary to the classic assumption of Modigliani and Miller (1958), firms do not always 
choose debt levels optimal to their needs. The literature shows, for example, that, due to supply 
frictions, observed capital structures differ from those demanded by the firms (Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2006). Beck (2011) makes a similar assertion based on survey data of firms in 
resource-dependent countries. 
Recent literature highlights firm- and industry-specific factors affecting the capital 
structure of firms. Frank and Goyal (2009) show that leverage tends to increase with firm size 
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and more tangible assets. Lower leverage, in turn, is related to higher profitability and high 
market-to-book ratios. They also find evidence that firms increase leverage when anticipate 
high inflation. 
These results are not unambiguous, however. Considering data for nine Eastern European 
countries, Jõeveer (2013) finds that firms with a high share of tangible assets have lower 
leverage.  
Fan et al. (2012) demonstrate that country-specific factors are more important in 
determining firm capital structure than the particular industry in which the firm does business. 
They also find that legal systems originating in common law are associated with lower debt 
ratios, whereas higher development level, higher corruption and the existence of an explicit 
bankruptcy code are related to higher debt ratios. Higher debt ratios are also observed in 
countries where the tax benefit of leverage is positive. This study further notes that debt 
maturity tends to be longer in countries with common law legal origins and shorter in more 
corrupt countries and in countries with large government bond markets. Specifically, the 
authors suggest that suppliers of capital inﬂuence the debt-ratio choices of firms. They ﬁnd 
that leverage is higher in countries with deposit insurance, suggesting that the role of banking 
industry is important. 
Jõeveer (2013) finds evidence for emerging countries that a large presence of foreign 
banks and high level of bank concentration coincide with lower leverage of firms. 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) argue that lending to large firms is less vulnerable to credit 
supply shocks than lending to smaller or riskier firms. Further, borrowers facing relatively 
high agency costs are the first to face limitations in access to finance in a “flight to quality" 
(e.g. Bernanke et al., 1996). Given that resource firms are typically large, well-known and 
possess considerable tangible assets, we would expect a certain degree of immunity to supply 
shocks and easier access to finance for resource firms than other firms in resource-dependent 
countries. 
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Recent discussions in structural economics highlight the evolving role of the financial 
sector at various stages of economic development. As economies develop, they tend to become 
increasingly reliant on market-based finance. Moreover, a country’s deviation from its optimal 
financial structure is reflected in depressed levels of economic activity (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2011). 
Lin et al. (2009) observe that the optimal mix of banks and markets or big and small banks 
depends on the economy’s factor endowments. The relative composition of labor, capital and 
natural resources define the optimal structure for production, while the production structure 
defines the optimal financial sector. Capital- intensive countries tend to have big production 
firms and are thus better served by a market-based financial system or big banks. Labor-
intensive economies, in contrast, have smaller firms better served by small, local banks. 
Unfortunately for our purposes, the authors merely acknowledge natural resources as an initial 
factor endowment without delving deeper into the specific role of natural resources. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) discuss colonial endowments. 
They note that colonies built around extractive industries or agriculture with large returns to 
scale tended to have weak property rights. In colonies settled by large groups of immigrants, 
in contrast, property rights tended to be stronger and levels of education and financial and 
economic development higher. As a result, beneficial institutions could not be said to be 
exogenously determined. 
To the best of our knowledge, no paper in the literature investigates the capital structure 
of resource firms or the capital structure of firms in resource-dependent countries using micro-
level data. In contributing to the existing literature, our hypothesis is that large resource assets 
lead to a resource-dependent economy with a financial sector geared to serving large resource 
firms. Smaller firms and emerging industries thus lack adequate access to financial services, 
thereby exacerbating the resource curse. 
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3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Data description 
Using firm data from Bloomberg, we gather financial data from companies included in the 
main equity indices of 73 countries over the period 2007–2013. For the largest equity market, 
the US, we use firms in the S&P500. A list of all the equity indices used appears in Appendix 
6. 
Our approach omits fully state-owned companies, which obviously play huge roles in 
many resource-rich countries. The problem is that financial information on such companies is 
often quite limited, which makes them anyway difficult to include in the data (Wolf, 2009). 
Other non-listed firms are also omitted due to data availability. 
We also limit the data to non-financial firms and countries with observations for at least 
three firms. We remove observations with missing values on debt or assets and trim the data 
by excluding observations where book leverage exceeds four times the median absolute 
deviation from the median.9 Our final sample consists of 4,319 non-financial firms over seven 
years and 25,373 firm-year observations from 70 different countries of domicile. 
We measure capital structure with commonly used indicators (Fan et al., 2012). Book 
leverage, or more precisely, short-term and long-term interest-bearing debt to total assets is 
used as the main indicator of company leverage as this is the most available indicator on 
leverage. While ratios based on market values might be more relevant, managers focus on 
book leverage because debt is better supported by assets in place than by growth opportunities 
(Myers, 1977). Book leverage is also preferred because financial markets fluctuate 
considerably (as evidenced during our sample period). We use market leverage, i.e. short- and 
long-term interest-bearing debt to total market value of the firm as an alternative measure of 
leverage. To provide a more thorough picture of the capital structure of firms, we separately 
                                                   
9 As we are very careful in removing outliers as the tails of distribution could contain valuable 
information, our approach initially excludes only 56 or 0.2% of firm-year observations. Thereafter, 
we test the robustness of the results with more restricted samples. 
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consider the ratio of short- and long-term debt to assets and the share of long-term debt to total 
debt as a measure of debt maturity. As the investments of resource firms tend to be bulky, we 
expect them to have debt with longer maturity than non-resource firms (Berglof and Lehmann, 
2009). 
As our firm-specific control variables, we use common measures of firm size, tangibility 
and profitability (see e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988). Firm size is measured by taking a 
natural logarithm of the US dollar value of total assets. As a measure of tangibility, we use the 
amount of property, plant and equipment relative to total assets. Profitability is measured by 
cash from operations to total assets as it describes the capability of the firm to generate cash 
to finance investments. We also use market-to-book ratio as an additional firm-specific 
variable to describe growth opportunities.  
Our country-specific control variables are mostly taken from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI). We use variables that the literature finds significantly related 
to capital structure measures, i.e. GDP growth rate, inflation, bank concentration, domestic 
lending to private sector, stock market turnover, corruption and profit tax rate.10 We also 
include three binary variables: “developed” to indicate a country was classified as high income 
country by World Bank in 2008, “deposit insurance” to show the country has some sort of 
deposit insurance scheme, and “common law” to highlight common law origins of the legal 
system. Credit rating is taken from Standard and Poor’s ratings as of 2011.  
The summary statistics are presented in Table 9.11 Both firm and country variables and 
their sources are described in detail in Appendix 7. The market variables in Table 9, the trading 
volume of equity markets and market-to-book ratio suffer extensively from missing values. 
We omit them from our regressions whenever the estimated coefficient for the variable in 
                                                   
10 For some countries, we have only one observation for profit tax rate in 2013. As tax rates generally 
do not fluctuate much, we use this observation for all years. In any case, when we test the results 
without the indicator they remain very similar. For corruption, we have inverted the scale of original 
data for higher values to indicate more corrupt. 
11 Variable means by country are listed in Appendix 8. 
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question is insignificant to reduce the loss of observations. We do the same with bank 
concentration, credit to private sector and tangibility. 
Table 9. Summary statistics of selected variables 
 
 
We classify resource firms as firms that have GICS classifications in the industrial 
categories “Metals & Mining” and “Oil & Gas Exploration & Production” or its sub-industry 
categories “Oil & Gas Drilling,” “Integrated Oil & Gas” or “Coal & Consumable Fuels.” This 
gives us 580 individual firms and 3,501 firm-year observations. 
Resource-dependent countries are defined as countries where minerals account for more 
than 40% of total exports on average during the sample period (Nili and Rastad, 2007). 
Because our purpose is to establish whether or not a given country’s competitiveness is based 
Statistic n Mean St. Dev. Min. Median Max.
Book leverage 25,373 0.24 0.18 0.00 0.23 1.02
Market leverage 23,506 0.25 0.22 0.00 0.20 1.07
Maturity 25,373 0.53 0.36 0.00 0.62 1.00
St debt 25,373 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.05 1.00
Lt debt 25,373 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.12 1.02
Size 25,230 6.75 2.85 -9.39 7.13 13.59
Tangibility 23,018 0.34 0.24 0.00 0.31 1.02
Profitability 25,223 0.09 0.12 -3.32 0.08 1.68
Market-to-book 23,509 1.44 1.34 0.02 1.04 28.32
Corruption 25,373 -0.43 1.05 -2.53 -0.08 1.28
CPI 25,251 4.29 4.07 -4.86 3.27 40.64
Concentration 24,280 0.61 0.26 0.07 0.60 1.00
Private credit 24,135 1.09 0.58 0.11 1.13 2.24
Market activity 23,647 82.32 90.77 0.02 58.09 952.67
GDP growth 25,373 3.34 3.87 -14.81 2.96 19.59
GDP/cap 25,369 24,099.88 21,622.46 533.17 15,655.08 102,832.3
Profit tax 25,366 0.39 0.14 0.11 0.37 1.19
Variables: “Book leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to total assets; “Market 
leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to market value of the firm; “Maturity”− Long-
term debt total debt; “St debt”− Short-term interest bearing debt to total assets; “Lt debt”− Long-term 
interest bearing debt to total assets; “Size”− Natural logarithm of assets in US dollars, millions; 
“Tangibility”− Fixed assets to total assets; “Profitability”− Cash from operations to total assets; “Market-
to-book”− Market value to total assets; “Corruption”− Corruption, high value indicates more corrupt, 
“CPI”− Consumer price inflation, %, year-on-year; “Concentration”− The share of assets of the three 
largest banks of total bank assets; “Private credit”− Domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP; “Market 
activity”− Stock market turnover, % of GDP; “GDP growth”− Annual real GDP growth rate, %; “GDP/cap”− 
Gross domestic product in US dollars per capita; “Profit tax”− Profit tax, % of commercial profits.
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largely on minerals, we use mineral exports to total exports as our indicator of resource 
dependence. The alternative measure of mineral exports in excess of 10% of GDP is overbroad 
here as it captures countries such as Estonia, which has a very large export sector but modest 
resource endowments. Including such countries as resource-dependent would distort our 
findings. 
Countries where minerals share of total exports exceeds 40% in our sample include 
Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Peru, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. 
However, as WDI data omits diamond producers, we follow Kurronen (2015) and add 
diamond exports data to major diamond producers where data was available. Thus, Botswana 
was included in the group of resource-dependent countries so we have 18 countries out of 70.  
The correlation matrix in Table 10 shows that more profitable firms have less debt and that 
bigger and more tangible firms use more debt, which is in line with Frank and Goyal (2009). 
Longer debt maturity is associated with larger firm size, jurisdictions with common law 
legal origins, lower rates of corruption and greater economic development. High rates of 
GDP growth, inflation and corruption seem to coincide with shorter debt maturity. 
Among our control variables, corruption seems to be highly correlated with other 
explanatory variables. In particular, it is highly and negatively correlated with level of 
economic development, credit rating and level of bank credit to private sector. 
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Based on our data, resource firms have lower debt levels and that carry debt of longer maturity 
than other firms. The difference is statistically significant for both leverage variables at 1% 
level based on the Welch Two Sample t-test (Table 11). Due to the volatile period around the 
global financial crisis, we also check the variables for each year separately to discover any 
anomalies that might drive our results. The result for significant difference in both book and 
market leverage is valid for each year in our sample except for 2013, where we find no 
significant difference for resource firms and other firms. The result on debt maturity is not as 
strong; we find statistically significant difference for individual years between the two groups 
only for 2012 and 2013 at the 10% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
When dividing our sample by country groups, we find the result of significant difference 
in leverage between resource and non-resource firms robust for rich countries and resource-
dependent countries. However, we find no significant difference in developing countries for 
book leverage for resource and non-resource firms. The leverage for resource firms is clearly 
higher in developing countries than in developed countries. For developed countries, we find 
no significant difference in debt maturity for resource and non-resource firms. Summary 
statistics are presented in Table 11 for various country groups. 
Table 11 also shows that resource firms have more tangible assets than other firms in our 
data except such firms in resource-dependent countries. Most empirical evidence has shown 
(Frank and Goyal 2009) that, like the resource firms in our data, firms with more tangible 
assets are expected to have more, not less, debt. This finding might be due to the volatile end 
product prices of raw materials, which heighten uncertainty of cash flow for resource firms, 
despite their observed asset tangibility. Resource firms are also no larger in terms of assets 
than other firms except in resource-dependent countries. This finding could be explained by 
the fact that our sample consists only of firms included in the main equity index of each 
country. We find no difference in profitability for resource firms and other firms.  
We confirm the findings with US data, where the differences in country-specific factors 
do not disturb the analysis. As US financial markets have size and depth to service the needs 
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of the firms, we expect firm capital structure in the US to well reflect the demand for capital. 
Within our sample of 420 non-financial US firms, 41 are classified as resource firms. The 
results in Table 11 are robust with the cross-country data.  
Table 11 also highlights the fact that non-resource firms in resource-dependent countries 
seem to have less debt than their counterparts in other countries. This could be due to different 
industrial mixes among surveyed countries or other country-specific factors that do not need 
to be independent of resource-dependence. While debt maturity is slightly longer for the 
resource firms than other firms in our full sample, the average maturity is shorter in resource-
dependent countries than elsewhere. 
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Table 11. Summary statistics of the firm variables by groups 
 
 
Resource firms Non-resource firms
N Mean
St. 
Dev.
Min.
Medi
an
Max. N Mean
St. 
Dev.
Min.
Medi
an
Max.
All countries
Book leverage 3,501 0.21 0.17 0 0.2 0.94 21,872 0.24 0.18 0 0.23 1.02 <0.01
Market leverage 3,193 0.21 0.2 0 0.15 0.95 20,313 0.26 0.22 0 0.21 1.07 <0.01
Maturity 3,501 0.55 0.38 0 0.64 1 21,872 0.53 0.36 0 0.61 1 0.01
Size 3,494 6.71 3.38 -9.39 7.25 13.08 21,736 6.75 2.75 -8.9 7.1 13.59 <0.01
Tangibility 3,001 0.44 0.26 0 0.44 1.02 20,017 0.33 0.23 0 0.29 1 <0.01
Profitability 3,484 0.09 0.15 -3.32 0.09 1.59 21,739 0.09 0.11 -2.45 0.08 1.68 0.99
Developed countries
Book leverage 1,825 0.19 0.15 0 0.18 0.91 11,378 0.25 0.17 0 0.24 1.01 <0.01
Market leverage 1,697 0.18 0.18 0 0.15 0.89 10,883 0.26 0.21 0 0.22 1.07 <0.01
Maturity 1,825 0.64 0.37 0 0.79 1 11,378 0.65 0.33 0 0.77 1 0.42
Size 1,818 7.75 2.36 -2.33 7.94 13.08 11,242 8.11 2.06 0.39 8.4 13.59 0.01
Tangibility 1,716 0.49 0.28 0 0.51 1.02 10,868 0.3 0.22 0 0.26 1 <0.01
Profitability 1,824 0.09 0.15 -3.32 0.1 1.59 11,357 0.09 0.09 -2.45 0.09 1.1 0.2
Developing countries
Book leverage 1,676 0.25 0.19 0 0.23 0.94 10,494 0.24 0.19 0 0.22 1.02 0.12
Market leverage 1,496 0.24 0.23 0 0.17 0.95 9,430 0.26 0.24 0 0.2 0.99 0.01
Maturity 1,676 0.44 0.35 0 0.44 1 10,494 0.4 0.35 0 0.37 1 <0.01
Size 1,676 5.57 3.93 -9.39 6.47 12.95 10,494 5.3 2.66 -8.9 5.21 11.76 <0.01
Tangibility 1,285 0.38 0.21 0 0.38 0.94 9,149 0.36 0.24 0 0.32 1 <0.01
Profitability 1,660 0.09 0.15 -1.75 0.08 0.77 10,382 0.08 0.13 -1.62 0.08 1.68 0.2
Resource-dependent countries
Book leverage 716 0.18 0.16 0 0.15 0.91 3,697 0.21 0.18 0 0.2 0.93 <0.01
Market leverage 668 0.16 0.17 0 0.11 0.89 3,407 0.21 0.2 0 0.17 0.99 <0.01
Maturity 716 0.53 0.37 0 0.65 1 3,697 0.49 0.38 0 0.56 1 0.01
Size 716 6.8 2.32 -0.98 6.71 12.95 3,697 6.03 2.08 -0.71 6.1 11.41 <0.01
Tangibility 697 0.38 0.24 0 0.38 0.89 3,553 0.38 0.24 0 0.35 0.98 0.63
Profitability 703 0.1 0.15 -0.91 0.1 1.59 3,615 0.1 0.12 -1 0.09 1.1 0.87
Non-resource countries
Book leverage 2,785 0.22 0.18 0 0.21 0.94 18,175 0.25 0.18 0 0.24 1.02 <0.01
Market leverage 2,525 0.23 0.21 0 0.17 0.95 16,906 0.27 0.23 0 0.22 1.07 <0.01
Maturity 2,785 0.55 0.38 0 0.63 1 18,175 0.54 0.36 0 0.62 1 0.04
Size 2,778 6.68 3.61 -9.39 7.42 13.08 18,039 6.9 2.85 -8.9 7.41 13.59 <0.01
Tangibility 2,304 0.46 0.26 0 0.46 1.02 16,464 0.32 0.22 0 0.28 1 <0.01
Profitability 2,781 0.09 0.14 -3.32 0.09 0.77 18,124 0.09 0.11 -2.5 0.08 1.68 0.79
US
Book leverage 279 0.2 0.1 0 0.21 0.47 2,584 0.24 0.16 0 0.24 1.01 <0.01
Market leverage 267 0.19 0.13 0 0.17 0.73 2,487 0.21 0.17 0 0.16 0.96 0.1
Maturity 279 0.89 0.23 0 0.98 1 2,584 0.8 0.29 0 0.91 1 <0.01
Size 279 9.29 1.68 -0.76 9.26 12.76 2,584 9.29 1.25 1.54 9.24 13.59 0.04
Tangibility 271 0.67 0.19 0.01 0.72 0.96 2,376 0.23 0.19 0 0.16 0.9 <0.01
Profitability 279 0.13 0.08 -0.14 0.13 0.41 2,583 0.12 0.09 -2.45 0.11 0.52 0.02
Welch t-
test p-
value
Variables: “Book leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to total assets; “Market leverage”− Total long- 
and shor- term interest bearing debt to market value of the firm; “Maturity”− Long-term debt total debt;  “Size”− Natural 
logarithm of assets in US dollars, millions; “Tangibility”− Fixed assets to total assets; “Profitability”− Cash from operations to 
total assets. Welch two-sample t-test will null hypothesis: no difference in means.
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3.3.2 Methodological strategy 
To detect the main determinants for capital structure, we follow Jõeveer (2013), performing 
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for three categorical regressors: country, industry and year. 
We then extend the model using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to include continuous 
firm-specific variables: size, tangibility and profitability. This approach allows us to 
decompose the variation of dependent variable among the independent variables. The model 
can be written as 
?????=α+??+??+?? ? ??????? ? ???? ,   (1) 
where i,j,k and t are the indexes of firm, country, industry and year, respectively. Yijkt is the 
capital structure indicator of firm i, country j, industry k and year t. ?? is the country fixed 
effect, ??  is the industry fixed effect and ?? is the year effect. ??????? presents the firm specific 
one-period lagged variables and ????  is the random disturbance. 
We then extend the model to include the time-varying country-specific factors. The model 
becomes  
?????=α+??+?? ? ??????? ? ?????? ? ???? ,  (2) 
where ?????? represents the one-period lagged country-specific variables that can vary over 
time. We do not include country fixed effects here, as it would capture the resource country 
indicator. We use pooled OLS to detect the effect of different firm and country specific capital 
structure determinants. Next, we limit our sample to firms with no close link to the resource 
sector to determine whether location in a resource-dependent country affects the capital 
structure of the firm.  
We use robust standard errors clustered by firm to capture the correlation in regression 
residuals known to cause bias in OLS estimations using firm panel data (Petersen, 2009). We 
also cluster standard errors by year to check whether our dummies failed to capture a time 
effect. The difference in standard errors is very small compared to pooled OLS with White 
standard errors, and in line with the capital structure example presented by Petersen (2009). 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Variance decomposition 
In line with Jõeveer (2013), we see the most important determinant of a firm’s book leverage 
is its industry (Table 12). Country is also an important factor. Despite the fact that a major 
financial crisis hit the global economy during our sample period, year plays a role only in 
terms of market leverage.  
Debt maturity structure is clearly more dependent on country of domicile than a firm’s 
industry affiliation. This may reflect the fact that some countries have more market-based 
financial systems, which coincides with long-term debt, while bank-based financial structures 
are associated more with short-term debt (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002).  
When we add firm-specific variables, profitability emerges as the most important firm-
specific variable in explaining leverage. Profitable firms, not surprisingly, have less need for 
external debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). This result is different from Jõeveer (2013), who finds 
asset tangibility is the most important firm-specific determinant for leverage. Firm size is the 
most important firm-specific explanatory variable for maturity structure in our data, but our 
dummies for country and industry remain very important in explaining firm leverage.  
For columns 7–9 in Table 12, we replace the country dummy with country-specific fixed 
and time-variant variables. We also add binary indicators for resource firm and resource 
country. The assigned country variables capture some, but not all, of the variation related to 
the country dummies in columns 4–6. In particular, the model is poor at capturing book 
leverage, something expected from the literature (see e.g. Fan et al., 2012). We break this 
variable down into short- and long-term debt in the regressions to detect variation in detail.  
Notably, the mere fact of being domiciled in a resource-dependent country appears to be 
one of the most important country-specific determinants of the level of leverage in our sample 
firms. The resource firm indicator also explains part of the variation in leverage, even after we 
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control for industry fixed effects. The maturity structure, however, is not explained by our 
resource indicators when controlling for several other factors. 
Table 12. Variance decomposition 
 
  
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Maturity
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Maturity
Book 
Leverage
Market 
Leverage
Maturity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Country 0.37 0.43 0.73 0.25 0.32 0.46
Industry 0.62 0.50 0.27 0.30 0.36 0.18 0.34 0.28 0.19
Year 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00
Size 0.07 0.04 0.26 0.07 0.04 0.22
Tangibility 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.11
Profitability 0.22 0.26 0.00 0.29 0.30 0.00
Resource firm 0.01 0.01 0.00
Resource country 0.02 0.03 0.00
Private credit 0.01 0.02 0.03
Market activity 0.01 0.05 0.05
Concentration 0.02 0.01 0.04
Deposit insurace 0.01 0.01 0.01
Corruption 0.01 0.01 0.10
CPI 0.00 0.01 0.02
Profit tax 0.01 0.01 0.01
Common law 0.01 0.05 0.07
GDP growth 0.00 0.02 0.02
Developed 0.00 0.01 0.06
Rating 0.01 0.04 0.06
R2 0.13 0.23 0.35 0.21 0.32 0.39 0.17 0.30 0.37
Obs 25373 23506 25373 22753 21083 22753 19001 17569 19001
Notes: Each cell represents the variation that is addressed to the given explanatory variable as a share of total 
variation explained by the model. Dependent variables: “Book leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest 
bearing debt to total assets; “Market leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to market 
value of the firm; “Maturity”− Long-term debt total debt. Independent variables: “Size”− Natural logarithm of 
assets in US dollars, millions; “Tangibility”− Fixed assets to total assets; “Profitability”− Cash from operations to 
total assets;  "Resource firm"− Binary variable for 1=resource firm; "Resource country"− Binary variable with 
1=Resource-dependent country;“Corruption”− Corruption, high value indicates more corrupt, “CPI”− Consumer 
price inflation, %, year-on-year; “Concentration”− The share of assets of the three largest banks of total bank 
assets; “Private credit”− Domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP; “Market activity”− Stock market turnover, % 
of GDP; "Common law"− Binary variable with 1=common law legal origins; “GDP growth”− Annual real GDP 
growth rate, %; “Developed”− Binary variable with 1=developed country; "Deposit insurance"− Binary variable 
for deposit insurance with 1=deposit insurance scheme; “Profit tax”− Profit tax, % of commercial profits; 
"Rating"− S&P country credit rating in numeric scale. 
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3.4.2 Regression results 
Our regression results presented in Table 13show that resource firms and firms in resource-
dependent countries tend to have less debt, even when controlling for firm- and country-
specific factors. The result is especially clear in the case of short-term debt. The coefficient 
for debt maturity is positive, but insignificant, for both resource indicators. Firm-specific 
control variables are similar to the main findings of the previous literature. Bigger and more 
tangible firms have more debt and that debt carries longer maturity. Profitability is negatively 
associated with leverage.  
A country’s institutional environment matters greatly for firm capital structure. Previous 
research shows banks tend to provide shorter term debt than debt markets. Our regression here 
also back up the notion that a higher level of bank credit to private sector is linked to more, 
but shorter, term debt. Correspondingly, higher stock market activity coincides with less debt 
and of longer maturity as firms in more market-based financial systems rely more heavily on 
equity finance and bond issues to raise money. Bank concentration is related to less debt, 
especially long-term debt. Common law legal origins and deposit insurance schemes are 
related to less debt and debt with longer maturity. 
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Table 13. Pooled regression results  
 
Book leverage Market leverage Short-term debt Long-term debt Maturity
Size 0.011*** 0.010*** -0.001* 0.013*** 0.039***
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Tangibility 0.135*** 0.150*** 0.125*** 0.277***
(.015) (.016) (.011) (.023)
Profitability -0.355*** -0.473*** -0.191*** -0.159*** -0.062**
(.029) (.038) (.016) (.016) (.031)
Market-to-book -0.004** -0.040*** -0.004*** -0.003* -0.017***
(.002) (.003) (.001) (.002) (.004)
Resource firm -0.064*** -0.082*** -0.029*** -0.042*** 0.047
(.020) (.020) (.011) (.016) (.034)
Resource country -0.024** -0.031*** -0.017*** -0.007 0.021
(.010) (.011) (.005) (.007) (.016)
Private credit 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.035*** -0.043***
(.009) (.010) (.005) (.013)
Market activity -0.011* -0.030*** -0.009*** 0.019**
(.006) (.006) (.002) (.009)
Concentration -0.071*** -0.088*** -0.069*** -0.199***
(.015) (.018) (.009) (.022)
Deposit insurance -0.024** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.002 0.030*
(.011) (.011) (.005) (.007) (.016)
Corruption -0.018** -0.029*** 0.013*** -0.027*** -0.112***
(.008) (.009) (.004) (.005) (.013)
CPI 0.001 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Profit tax 0.025 0.041* -0.013 0.047*** 0.085***
(.020) (.023) (.010) (.016) (.032)
Common law -0.025*** -0.063*** -0.040*** 0.017*** 0.089***
(.009) (.010) (.004) (.006) (.014)
GDP growth 0.001 -0.0003 0.001*** 0.000 -0.003***
(.001) (.001) (.0) (.001) (.001)
Developed -0.005 0.030** -0.004 -0.001 -0.056***
(.012) (.013) (.006) (.008) (.018)
Rating -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005**
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Constant 0.190*** 0.430*** 0.130*** 0.063** 0.454***
(.036) (.045) (.015) (.027) (.060)
Observations 14,457 14,261 16,620 16,457 14,457
R2 0.19 0.34 0.23 0.29 0.39
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm below coefficient in parenthesis. Year and industry dummies included in all 
regressions. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variables: “Book leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing 
debt to total assets; “Market leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to market value of the firm; “St debt”− 
Short-term interest bearing debt to total assets; “Lt debt”− Long-term interest bearing debt to total assets;  “Maturity”− Long-
term debt to total debt. One period lagged values of independent variables are used. Independent variables: “Size”− Natural 
logarithm of assets in US dollars, millions; “Tangibility”− Fixed assets to total assets; “Profitability”− Cash from operations to 
total assets;  "Resource firm"− Binary variable for 1=resource firm; "Resource country"− Binary variable with 1=Resource-
dependent country;“Corruption”− Corruption, high value indicates more corrupt, “CPI”− Consumer price inflation, %, year-on-
year; “Concentration”− The share of assets of the three largest banks of total bank assets; “Private credit”− Domestic credit to 
private sector, % of GDP; “Market activity”− Stock market turnover, % of GDP; "Common law"− Binary variable with 1=common 
law legal origins; “GDP growth”− Annual real GDP growth rate, %; “Developed”− Binary variable with 1=developed country; 
"Deposit insurance"− Binary variable for deposit insurance with 1=deposit insurance scheme; “Profit tax”− Profit tax, % of 
commercial profits; "Rating"− S&P country credit rating in numeric scale. Independent variables "Tangibility", "Market-to-
Book", "Private Credit", "Market activity" and "Concentration" removed from the regressions when the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at 10% level due to large amount of missing observations.
Dependent variable:
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Country credit rating is negatively related to leverage, even if we do not control separately 
the development level in our regressions. That result is in line with Jõeveer (2013) and could 
reflect the finding of Fan et al. (2012) that government bond markets seem to crowd out firm 
debt. In our regressions, the level of economic development is positively related to market 
leverage. Somewhat surprisingly, debt maturity is shorter in developed countries, which 
contradicts the positive correlation observed between the two variables in Table 10. 
Overall leverage is lower in more corrupted countries and debt maturity tends to be shorter. 
Contrary to our result, Fan et al. (2012) find that the level of debt is higher in more 
corrupted countries. They reason that this is due to the widespread use of equity financing in 
less corrupted countries. However, we also have opposite signs for the coefficient when 
looking at short- and long-term debt in isolation. The association of higher corruption to 
more short-term and less long-term debt is in line with results of Fungáčová et al. (2015). In 
countries with weak institutions, banks seem unwilling to provide long-term financing. 
Similarly, higher inflation coincides with shorter debt maturity. However, as noted from 
correlation matrix in Table 10, corruption is also highly correlated to development level and 
country credit rating, so variables are susceptible to multicollinearity that can lead to 
instability in the coefficients without compromising the model.  
When it comes to short-term debt and total debt relative to assets, our model seems to 
capture only about a fifth of variation. In contrast, long-term debt and debt relative to firm 
value are better captured by our model. This level of explanatory power is in line with previous 
research with similar cross-country firm leverage data (Fan et al., 2012). 
Our results are not driven only by flight to quality in the exceptional time of global 
financial crisis; the results hold for 2007 before the financial crisis hit.  Given that we do not 
have country dummies in our regressions, we confirm that the results are not driven by 
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individual countries either, by removing one by one countries with a large amount of 
observations, namely the US, Indonesia, Thailand and China. The results remain robust.12  
We test the interaction of resource firm indicator with firm size, tangibility and profitability 
with the results presented in Table 14. Larger resource firms have less debt and shorter 
maturity debt than smaller resource firms. More profitable resource firms have a higher level 
of market leverage. When the coefficient for the size variable and the resource firm-size 
interaction term are summed up, size does not seem to be associated with higher leverage for 
resource firms. This finding directly contradicts the very clear result in the earlier literature 
of a positive correlation between firm size and leverage (Frank and Goyal, 2009). As our 
results could reflect a strong positive correlation between size and profitability of resource 
firms, we test for this. While the correlation is higher in case of resource firms than all firms 
in our data presented in Table 10, the Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.18 it is not high 
enough to disturb the result by multicollinearity. We also find no evidence that investment 
intensity of resource firms declines significantly with size. 
 
                                                   
12 Regression results for 2007 and the regression results excluding one-by-one United States, 
Indonesia, Thailand and China are available on request. 
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Table 14. Pooled regression results with interaction terms 
 
Book leverage Market leverage Short term debt Long term debt Maturity
Size 0.015*** 0.014*** -0.001 0.016*** 0.043***
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.003)
Tangibility 0.155*** 0.169*** 0.151*** 0.281***
(.018) (.019) (.013) (.025)
Profitability -0.360*** -0.504*** -0.199*** -0.154*** -0.060*
(.034) (.047) (.019) (.018) (.034)
Market-to-book -0.005** -0.040*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.018***
(.002) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.004)
Resource firm 0.056 0.026 -0.026 0.086*** 0.142**
(.034) (.035) (.016) (.028) (.061)
Resource country -0.022** -0.029*** -0.017*** -0.007 0.024
(.010) (.011) (.005) (.007) (.016)
Private credit 0.040*** 0.063*** 0.036*** -0.039***
(.009) (.010) (.005) (.013)
Market activity -0.012** -0.031*** -0.009*** 0.017*
(.006) (.006) (.002) (.009)
Concentration -0.070*** -0.086*** -0.066*** -0.197***
(.015) (.018) (.009) (.022)
Deposit insurance -0.025** -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.001 0.027*
(.011) (.011) (.005) (.007) (.016)
Corruption -0.016* -0.026*** 0.013*** -0.026*** -0.109***
(.008) (.009) (.004) (.005) (.013)
CPI 0.001 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.001* -0.003**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Profit tax 0.026 0.043* -0.013 0.044*** 0.086***
(.020) (.023) (.010) (.015) (.032)
Common law -0.023** -0.062*** -0.040*** 0.018*** 0.091***
(.009) (.010) (.004) (.006) (.014)
GDP growth 0.001* -0.0001 0.001*** 0.00005 -0.003***
(.001) (.001) (.0) (.001) (.001)
Developed -0.007 0.029** -0.005 -0.003 -0.058***
(.011) (.013) (.006) (.008) (.018)
Rating -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005**
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Size*Resource firm -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.001 -0.012*** -0.017***
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.003) (.005)
Tangibility*Resource -0.035 -0.032 -0.073*** 0.058
(.037) (.039) (.025) (.067)
Profitability*Resourc 0.058 0.176*** 0.039 0.009 0.022
(.055) (.066) (.036) (.030) (.078)
Constant 0.150*** 0.392*** 0.128*** 0.028 0.418***
(.037) (.046) (.015) (.027) (.061)
Observations 14,457 14,261 16,620 16,457 14,457
R2 0.20 0.34 0.23 0.30 0.39
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm below coefficient in parenthesis. Year and industry dummies included in all 
regressions. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variables: “Book leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing 
debt to total assets; “Market leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to market value of the firm; “St debt”− 
Short-term interest bearing debt to total assets; “Lt debt”− Long-term interest bearing debt to total assets;  “Maturity”− Long-
term debt/total debt.  One period lagged values of independent variables are used.  Independent variables: “Size”− Natural 
logarithm of assets in US dollars, millions; “Tangibility”− Fixed assets to total assets; “Profitability”− Cash from operations to 
total assets;  "Resource firm"− Binary variable for 1=resource firm; "Resource country"− Binary variable with 1=Resource-
dependent country;“Corruption”− Corruption, high value indicates more corrupt, “CPI”− Consumer price inflation, %, year-on-
year; “Concentration”− The share of assets of the three largest banks of total bank assets; “Private credit”− Domestic credit to 
private sector, % of GDP; “Market activity”− Stock market turnover, % of GDP; "Common law"− Binary variable with 1=common 
law legal origins; “GDP growth”− Annual real GDP growth rate, %; “Developed”− Binary variable with 1=developed country; 
"Deposit insurance"− Binary variable for deposit insurance with 1=deposit insurance scheme; “Profit tax”− Profit tax, % of 
commercial profits; "Rating"− S&P country credit rating in numeric scale. Independent variables "Tangibility", "Market-to-Book", 
"Private Credit", "Market activity" and "Concentration" removed from the regressions when the coefficient is not statistically 
significant at 10% level due to large amount of missing observations.
Dependent variable:
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Our results suggest that firms domiciled in resource-dependent countries have less debt, 
especially short-term debt. This could, of course, be due to the fact that, even when industry 
fixed effects are controlled for in our regressions, resource firms and firms closely linked to 
resources in general take on less debt which steers the average financial structure of the 
resource-dependent country where resource firms play a big role.  
There are many challenges in finding the right control group when seeking additional 
evidence that location in a resource-dependent country affects the capital structure of a firm. 
Many industries such as transportation and certain types of manufacturing are likely to be 
closely linked to resource firms in resource-dependent countries. Such close relations could 
affect access to finance for such firms. 
We limit the sample to two consumer sectors in the data: Consumer Staples and Consumer 
Discretionary. We expect the consumer sectors to be less linked to resource sector than many 
other industries. Consumer sectors are not likely to be involved with mineral extraction supply 
chains, and even if the consumer sectors serve the employees of resource firms, the resource 
sector is not usually a major employer in a country.13 Moreover, this control group is 
sufficiently large (7,541 firm-year observations, of which 1,236 are from resource-dependent 
countries). The average debt maturity for these firms is 0.48 and book leverage is 0.23, so 
these firms have less debt and the debt has shorter maturity than that of non-resource firms in 
general (see Table 11).  Again, the results in Table 15 suggest that overall leverage is lower 
for firms in countries where mineral exports play a pronounced role.  
 
 
                                                   
13 Employment data from the International Labour Organization database for Australia, Chile, 
Colombia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Norway, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab 
Emirates and Venezuela show that, on average, mining and quarrying activities account for 1.5% of 
total employment. 
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Table 15. Firms in consumer sectors  
 
 
We cannot rule out that the link between being domiciled in resource-dependent country 
and differences in capital structure are due to some omitted variable. However, we control for 
many of the variables the previous literature has shown important in determining firm capital 
Book leverage Market leverage Short term debt Long term debt maturity
Size 0.013*** 0.009** -0.002 0.014*** 0.041***
(.003) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.004)
Tangibility 0.124*** 0.171*** 0.009 0.123*** 0.288***
(.027) (.030) (.016) (.020) (.040)
Profitability -0.355*** -0.645*** -0.236*** -0.146*** -0.185***
(.049) (.071) (.031) (.028) (.055)
Resource country -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.030** -0.026** 0.024
(.016) (.019) (.012) (.011) (.031)
Private credit 0.042** 0.038*** -0.019** -0.054***
(.017) (.011) (.009) (.021)
Market activity -0.037*** -0.009*
(.011) (.005)
Concentration -0.083*** -0.101*** -0.032* -0.065*** -0.189***
(.022) (.031) (.018) (.015) (.035)
Deposit insurance -0.02 -0.01 -0.033** 0.007 0.042
(.019) (.022) (.014) (.011) (.031)
Corruption -0.053*** -0.087*** -0.021** -0.037*** -0.109***
(.013) (.019) (.010) (.009) (.023)
CPI 0.003** 0.004*** 0.005*** -0.002* -0.006***
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Profit tax 0.056 0.027 -0.015 0.081*** 0.231***
(.035) (.040) (.019) (.028) (.057)
Common law -0.026* -0.057*** -0.062*** 0.037*** 0.154***
(.015) (.021) (.010) (.011) (.023)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002** -0.005***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Developed -0.004 0.011 -0.019* 0.01 -0.019
(.016) (.023) (.011) (.012) (.031)
Rating -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.008**
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Constant 0.307*** 0.511*** 0.228*** 0.088** 0.274***
(.055) (.075) (.042) (.038) (.092)
Observations 5,483 4,641 4,927 5,342 5,342
R2 0.16 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.38
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm below coefficient in parenthesis. Year and industry dummies included in all 
regressions. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variables: “Book leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to 
total assets; “Market leverage”− Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to market value of the firm; “St debt”− Short-term 
interest bearing debt to total assets; “Lt debt”− Long-term interest bearing debt to total assets;  “Maturity”− Long-term debt/total 
debt.  One period lagged values of independent variables are used.  Independent variables: “Size”− Natural logarithm of assets in US 
dollars, millions; “Tangibility”− Fixed assets to total assets; “Profitability”− Cash from operations to total assets;  "Resource country"− 
Binary variable with 1=Resource-dependent country;“Corruption”− Corruption, high value indicates more corrupt, “CPI”− Consumer 
price inflation, %, year-on-year; “Concentration”− The share of assets of the three largest banks of total bank assets; “Private credit”− 
Domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP; “Market activity”− Stock market turnover, % of GDP; "Common law"− Binary variable with 
1=common law legal origins; “GDP growth”− Annual real GDP growth rate, %; “Developed”− Binary variable with 1=developed 
country; "Deposit insurance"− Binary variable for deposit insurance with 1=deposit insurance scheme; “Profit tax”− Profit tax, % of 
commercial profits; "Rating"− S&P country credit rating in numeric scale. Independent variables "Tangibility", "Market-to-Book", 
"Private Credit", "Market activity" and "Concentration" removed from the regressions when the coefficient is not statistically 
significant at 10% level due to large amount of missing observations.
Dependent variable:
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structure. Moreover, mineral resources can be considered as an initial factor endowment of a 
country. Consequently, other country-specific factors are not necessarily independent of its 
natural resources. The earlier literature has found many institutional factors causing 
challenges for economic development in resource-dependent economies such as poor 
governance and rent-seeking behavior (Bardhan, 1997) and low levels of education (Gylfason, 
2001). 
Resource-dependence might be endogenous to the level of economic development (see 
e.g. Frankel, 2010) as high resource-dependence could lead to underdevelopment of other 
sectors. However, our sample resource-dependent countries do not show lower levels of 
economic development measured in terms of GDP. Endogeneity might also rise as the 
financial sector influences the development of resource firms as well.  However, as shown in 
Table 11, capital structure of resource firms seems similar across different groups of countries 
and also in the Unites States, suggesting that the lower debt level of resource firms is not 
limited to resource-dependent countries. 
Thus, while reverse causality cannot be ruled out, we argue it is more likely that the 
financial infrastructure and firm capital structure are organized on the basis of the factor 
endowments in the economy and not that resource dependence emerges because of the 
financial sector structure. We also use lagged values of independent variables to reduce the 
risk for contemporaneous correlation between independent variables and the error term.  
We encounter a significant survival bias as our sample includes only listed firms included 
in the main equity index of a given country. Even so, we would expect our results to be weaker 
than when smaller firms are included, because larger firms are less constrained by the practices 
of the domestic banking sector.  
Whether the finding of less debt, especially shorter maturity debt is due to the fact that 
financial sector in resource dependent countries does not provide services that firms need, or 
due to the idea that certain types of firms thrive in resource-dependent countries, our results 
suggest that a major sector in the country might steer the economy in a direction unfavorable 
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for firms needing different services. Being domiciled in resource-dependent country seems to 
be a previously undetected country-specific determinant for capital structure. In particular, 
short-term debt is used by emerging industries, so the unavailability of financial services might 
hamper the rise of new businesses and exacerbate the resource curse. 
  
3.5 Conclusions 
Our hypothesis is that financial services in countries with large resource sectors are organized 
to serve large resource firms at the expense of other firms that may have different financial 
needs. The lack of access to finance for small firms and firms in emerging industries hampers 
growth and exacerbates the effects of the resource curse. 
We present empirical evidence that resource firms tend to have lower debt loads than other 
non-financial firms. This finding remains robust when several firm- and country-specific 
factors are introduced into our regressions. We also find evidence of longer debt maturity for 
resource firms. Our results also indicate that the level of leverage of the resource firms does 
not increase with firm size as it does for other firms.  
Notably, firms in other sectors in resource-dependent countries exhibit capital structures 
similar to resource firms. Their overall leverage is lower. Short-term debt, in particular, is less 
commonly used in resource-dependent countries than in other countries. This suggests that the 
existence of a large resource sector might affect other industries through some financial 
channel. While we cannot verify whether the channel is through the financial sector or other 
unobserved institutional factors, it is clear that the simple fact of being located in a resource-
dependent country affects the capital structure of a firm. 
These results are hardly exhaustive. Data limitations prevent us from finding more detailed 
information on what kinds of firms or industries thrive or fail in resource-dependent 
economies. Moreover, we have only considered large listed firms included in the main equity 
index of each sample country. Such firms are survivors. They have grown and flourished in 
 77 
 
the given environment and are perhaps no longer restricted in their access to finance. Still, we 
observe that the capital structure of these firms is tilted towards the capital structure of the 
resource sector in resource-dependent countries. It would be therefore interesting to extend 
this study to small and mid-sized companies that are more likely to be affected negatively by 
a domestic financial sector geared to serving the needs of large resource firms. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 6. Equity indices included 
 
 
Country Index in Bloomberg Country Index in Bloomberg
1 Argentina Argent Merval 37 Malaysia FTSE Malay KLCI
2 Australia ASX200 38 Mexico MEX IPC
3 Austria ATX Austria Trd 39 Mongolia MSE top 20
4 Bahrain Bahrain All Share 40 Namibia FTSE/Namibia
5 Belgium BEL 20 index 41 Netherlands AEX-index
6 Botswana Botswana Gab 42 New Zealand NZX 50
7 Brazil IBOVESPA 43 Nigeria Nigeria SE All
8 Bulgaria BSE Sofix 44 Norway OBX Stock
9 Canada TSX 45 Oman Muscat SM 30
10 Chile Chile SM Select 46 Pakistan KARACHI 100
11 China CSI300 47 Peru Peru Lima Gen
12 Colombia Colom COLCAP 48 Philippines PSEi Philippine
13 Croatia Zagreb CROBEX 49 Poland WIG 20
14 Czech Republic Prague SE index 50 Portugal PSI General POR
15 Denmark OMX Copenhagen 20 51 Quatar QE index
16 Egypt Egypt Hermes 52 Romania Bucharest BET
17 Estonia OMX Tallinn index 53 Russia RTS Index
18 Finland OMX Helsinki 25 54 Saudi Arabia Tadawull
19 France CAC 40 Index 55 Singapore FTSE Straits Tim
20 Germany DAX Index 56 Slovakia Slovak Share Index
21 Ghana GSE Comp 57 Slovenia Slovenia Blue Chip
22 Greece Athex Composite 58 South Africa FTSE/JSE Africa Top 40
23 Hong Kong Hang Seng 59 South Korea KRX 100
24 Hungary Budapest SE index 60 Spain IBEX35 ESP
25 India S&P BSE SENSEX 30 61 Sweden OMX STKH30
26 Indonesia Jakarta Comp 62 Switzerland Swiss Market Index
27 Ireland ISEQ Overall 63 Taiwan Taiwan TAIEX
28 Israel Tel Aviv 25 64 Tanzania Tanzania all sh
29 Italy FTSE MIB ITA 65 Thailand SE Thai Index
30 Japan Nikkei 225 66 Tunisia Tunis SE
31 Kazakhstan KASE 67 Turkey BIST 100 Index
32 Kenya Nairobi SE 20 68 Ukraine PFTS Index
33 Kuwait Kuwait SE Weighted 69 United Arab Emirates DFM General Index
34 Latvia OMX Riga index 70 United Kingdon FTSE 100 Index
35 Lithuania OMX Vilnius index 71 United States S&P500
36 Luxembourg LuxX 72 Venezuela Venezuela SM
73 Vietnam Ho Chi Minh Stk
Index compositions as of November 2013
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Appendix 7. Data description and sources 
 
Firm variables Description Source Bloomberg code
Sector Bloomberg GICS_SECTOR_NAME
Industry Bloomberg GICS_INDUSTRY_NAME
Sub-industry Bloomberg GICS_SUB_INDUSTRY_NAME
Country Country of domicile Bloomberg COUNTRY_OF_DOMICILE
Assets Total assets Bloomberg BS_TOT_ASSET
Market capitalization Market capitalization Bloomberg HISTORICAL_MARKET_CAP
Long-term debt
All interest-bearing financial obligations that are 
not current Bloomberg BS_LT_BORROW
Short-term debt
Includes bank overdrafts, short-term debts and 
borrowings, repurchase agreements Bloomberg BS_ST_BORROW
Cash From Operations Cash From Operations Bloomberg CF_CASH_FROM_OPER
Capital Expenditures Capital Expenditures Bloomberg CAPITAL_EXPEND
Fixed assets Property, plant and equipment Bloomberg ARD_PROPERTY_PLANT_EQUIP_NET
Value
Market capitalization + long and short term debt + 
preferred equity and minority interest Bloomberg
HISTORICAL_MARKET_CAP+BS_LT_BORROW+BS_ST_
BORROW+PREFERRED_EQUITY_&_MINORITY_INT
Market-to-book Value/Total assets Bloomberg
Size Natural logarithm of Total asset in USD Bloomberg/World DataBank
Profitability Cash From Operations/Total assets Bloomberg
Tangibility Property, plant and equipment/Total assets Bloomberg
Book leverage Total debt/Total assets
Market leverage Total debt/Value
Country variables Description Source
GDP USD Gross domestic product in US dollars World DataBank
GDP lcu Gross domestic product in local currency unit World DataBank
GDP per capita Gross domestic product in US dollars per capita World DataBank
GDP growth Annual GDP growth rate, % World DataBank
Developed
Binary variable with 1 indicating high-income 
economy by World Bank country rank in 2008 The World Bank country income classification
CPI Annual change in consumer price index, % World DataBank
Corruption
Corruption index by country ranking in 
standardized normal distribution higher values 
indicating less corrupt. We use inverted scale. World DataBank
Common law
Binary variable with 1 indicating common law legal 
origins La Porta et al. (1999)
Deposit insurance
Binary variable with 1 indicating that country has a 
deposit insurance Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005)
Profit tax rate Profit tax, % of commercial profits World DataBank
Bank concentration
Assets of three largest banks as a share of total 
commercial banking assets, % World DataBank
Private credit Domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP World DataBank
Market activity Stock market turnover, % of GDP World DataBank
Exchange rate Exchange rate USD per local currency World DataBank
Fuel exports Fuel exports, % of merchandise exports World DataBank
Metal exports Ores and metals exports, % of merchandise exports World DataBank
Diamond exports Diamond exports, % of merchandise exports
Rating
We change it into numeric with best AAA rating at 
21 and worst in our sample CC at value 5. Standard & Poor's
Central Statistics Ofﬁce of Botswana, Ghana statistical service, 
Statistics Namibia
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
by MSCI and Standard & Poor’s including 10 sectors, 
67 industries and 156 sub-industries
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Appendix 8. Variable means by country 
 
  
n
Bo
ok
 le
ve
ra
ge
M
ar
ke
t l
ev
er
ag
e
M
at
ur
ity
Si
ze
Ta
ng
ib
ili
ty
Pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y
M
ar
ke
t-
to
-b
oo
k
M
in
er
al
 e
xp
or
ts
Co
rr
up
tio
n
CP
I
Co
nc
en
tr
at
io
n
Pr
iv
at
e 
cr
ed
it
M
ar
ke
t a
ct
iv
ity
Co
m
m
on
 la
w
G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
D
ep
os
it 
in
su
ra
nc
e
Pr
of
it 
ta
x
G
D
P/
ca
p,
 U
SD
Ra
tin
g
Re
so
ur
ce
 c
ou
nt
ry
Argentina 55 0.23 0.33 0.66 7.76 0.54 0.15 1.00 0.12 0.45 9.23 0.56 0.13 0.01 0 4.6 1 1.09 11611.89 6 0
Australia 994 0.22 0.19 0.66 6.98 0.25 0.10 1.96 0.62 -2.01 2.69 0.86 1.23 0.88 1 2.82 0 0.48 55006.93 21 1
Austria 98 0.25 0.31 0.74 8.54 0.36 0.10 0.97 0.07 -1.67 2.21 0.59 1.16 0.15 0 1.03 1 0.51 48898.95 21 0
Bahrain 98 0.06 0.06 0.17 4.99 0.33 0.09 1.03 0.87 -0.30 2.46 0.86 0.66 0.03 0 4.64 1 0.14 21920.59 12 1
Belgium 81 0.28 0.29 0.73 8.86 0.27 0.09 1.41 0.13 -1.47 2.27 0.63 0.91 0.28 0 0.91 1 0.57 45855.86 18 0
Bermuda 19 0.46 0.43 0.92 8.85 0.36 0.06 1.12 0.06 -1.31 0.98 0.01 1 -1.9 1 0.41 88601.1 17 0
Botswana 59 0.11 0.05 0.44 3.39 0.40 0.20 2.30 0.73 -0.95 8.04 0.83 0.28 0 5.15 0 0.2 6305.7 14 1
Brazil 397 0.31 0.31 0.74 8.73 0.30 0.07 1.52 0.24 0.04 5.36 0.67 0.58 0.37 0 3.9 1 0.46 10408.74 12 0
Bulgaria 67 0.17 0.23 0.50 5.41 0.50 0.06 1.02 0.31 0.25 4.86 0.69 0.69 0.03 0 1.71 1 0.3 7107.11 12 0
Canada 1287 0.21 0.20 0.73 7.60 0.50 0.10 1.48 0.35 -1.99 1.70 0.68 1.25 0.90 1 1.54 1 0.3 48070.33 21 0
Chile 215 0.29 0.25 0.77 5.47 0.43 0.09 1.40 0.62 -1.44 3.19 0.52 1.00 0.20 0 4.09 1 0.26 12912.7 16 1
China 1749 0.25 0.19 0.32 7.74 0.39 0.07 2.42 0.03 0.52 3.40 0.30 1.24 1.12 0 9.77 0 0.45 4772.05 17 0
Colombia 59 0.20 0.18 0.78 7.99 0.30 0.08 1.26 0.60 0.33 3.87 0.85 0.44 0.08 0 4.53 1 0.79 6459.72 11 1
Croatia 134 0.28 0.39 0.51 6.09 0.46 0.06 0.93 0.18 0.00 2.97 0.64 0.68 0.03 0 -0.81 1 0.21 14105.49 11 0
Czech Republic 42 0.20 0.17 0.62 6.32 0.42 0.14 1.33 0.05 -0.26 2.63 0.62 0.51 0.12 0 0.89 1 0.51 20222.5 17 0
Denmark 97 0.24 0.18 0.77 8.13 0.24 0.14 2.25 0.10 -2.45 2.10 0.39 2.06 0 -0.49 1 0.28 59580.32 21 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 166 0.19 0.21 0.43 6.09 0.38 0.08 1.33 0.41 0.60 11.00 0.64 0.35 0.26 0 4.31 0 0.43 2580.08 7 1
Estonia 82 0.28 0.33 0.63 5.00 0.36 0.09 1.03 0.17 -0.94 4.51 0.96 0.89 0 0.49 1 0.52 16863.92 17 0
Finland 147 0.23 0.27 0.69 8.56 0.26 0.09 1.22 0.14 -2.29 2.21 0.89 0.90 0 0.09 1 0.43 48956.88 21 0
France 224 0.24 0.31 0.73 10.67 0.22 0.08 0.93 0.07 -1.42 1.55 0.31 1.09 0.59 0 0.64 1 0.66 42376.58 21 0
Germany 175 0.27 0.33 0.73 10.69 0.23 0.08 1.07 0.05 -1.74 1.70 0.57 1.02 0.59 0 1.02 1 0.47 43797.51 21 0
Ghana 77 0.21 0.23 0.27 4.06 0.38 0.09 1.54 0.30 0.01 12.20 0.64 0.16 0.00 1 8.28 0 0.32 1423.36 6 0
Greece 338 0.29 0.44 0.51 6.53 0.39 0.05 0.85 0.35 0.05 2.40 1.00 1.08 0.17 0 -3.83 1 0.46 26742.64 1 0
Hong Kong 143 0.25 0.25 0.71 0.33 0.09 1.49 0.13 -1.84 3.28 0.94 1.77 6.31 1 3.24 0 0.23 33677.13 21 0
Hungary 60 0.19 0.24 0.58 6.36 0.44 0.11 0.96 0.05 -0.34 4.90 0.82 0.63 0.17 0 -0.44 1 0.53 13663.62 10 0
India 176 0.20 0.17 0.62 8.85 0.27 0.14 2.50 0.23 0.50 9.57 0.26 0.49 0.58 1 7.3 1 0.44 1285.54 11 0
Indonesia 2240 0.26 0.28 0.40 2.95 0.38 0.07 1.41 0.39 0.67 5.98 0.29 0.31 0.14 0 5.84 1 0.39 2952.41 10 0
Ireland 274 0.21 0.22 0.62 6.51 0.22 0.06 1.44 0.02 -1.64 1.10 0.87 1.96 0.05 1 0.2 1 0.25 53666.34 13 0
Israel 111 0.34 0.28 0.65 7.15 0.27 0.14 1.82 0.02 -0.78 2.54 0.77 0.91 0.36 0 3.87 0 0.31 30832.28 16 0
Italy 171 0.31 0.35 0.69 9.32 0.29 0.09 1.15 0.06 -0.10 2.07 0.29 1.12 0.48 0 -1.05 1 0.69 37098.82 15 0
Japan 1350 0.28 0.36 0.58 9.35 0.32 0.07 0.89 0.05 -1.47 -0.09 0.95 1.80 0.98 0 0.46 1 0.41 40845.84 17 0
Kazakhstan 26 0.11 0.15 0.46 8.05 0.52 0.22 1.10 0.84 0.92 8.41 0.52 0.43 0.02 0 5.56 1 0.33 9967.61 13 1
Kenya 98 0.19 0.22 0.49 5.63 0.48 0.12 1.16 0.06 1.01 11.09 0.57 0.28 0.02 1 5.05 1 0.47 1028.69 7 0
Korea, Rep. 584 0.21 0.24 0.50 8.57 0.30 0.08 1.26 0.10 -0.46 2.92 0.51 1.39 1.45 0 3.48 1 0.33 22677.4 15 0
Kuwait 556 0.19 0.23 0.32 5.34 0.28 0.08 1.05 0.95 -0.23 5.11 0.90 0.68 0.17 0 2.29 0 0.11 45822.47 18 1
Latvia 171 0.20 0.36 0.39 3.39 0.44 0.05 0.53 0.10 -0.18 4.85 0.93 0.85 0 0.08 1 0.37 13732.31 10 0
Lithuania 145 0.24 0.35 0.45 5.55 0.51 0.09 0.83 0.24 -0.20 4.25 0.91 0.58 0 2.21 1 0.44 13680.97 12 0
Malaysia 138 0.23 0.16 0.71 8.49 0.41 0.16 2.28 0.20 -0.17 2.37 0.77 1.11 0.46 0 4.69 1 0.35 9344.33 14 0
Mexico 199 0.25 0.20 0.72 8.23 0.36 0.12 1.75 0.18 0.35 4.26 0.55 0.25 0.10 0 2.09 1 0.44 9276.85 12 0
Netherlands 128 0.28 0.25 0.80 9.53 0.24 0.10 1.17 0.15 -2.15 1.99 0.97 1.85 0.82 0 0.43 1 0.39 52079.9 21 0
New Zealand 211 0.23 0.22 0.74 6.50 0.41 0.09 1.59 0.09 -2.36 2.45 0.96 1.44 0.03 1 1.43 0 0.35 35292.23 18 0
Nigeria 577 0.18 0.22 0.25 3.93 0.45 0.08 1.47 0.89 1.05 10.73 0.73 0.21 0.03 0 5.98 1 0.4 2109.38 7 1
Norway 117 0.23 0.22 0.71 7.70 0.35 0.10 1.52 0.73 -2.09 1.88 0.92 0.49 0 0.99 1 0.41 93556.44 21 1
Oman 104 0.20 0.20 0.36 5.51 0.39 0.13 1.44 0.84 -0.21 4.81 0.71 0.41 0.09 0 4.79 1 0.22 19904.41 15 1
Pakistan 439 0.24 0.28 0.38 5.45 0.42 0.10 1.22 0.06 0.97 11.81 0.89 0.21 0.15 1 3.11 0 0.39 1130.23 5 0
Peru 146 0.24 0.24 0.58 6.55 0.50 0.12 1.49 0.64 0.31 3.14 0.67 0.27 0.03 0 6.51 1 0.37 5170.54 12 1
Philippines 140 0.32 0.27 0.68 7.12 0.35 0.11 1.65 0.08 0.67 4.28 0.63 0.31 0.12 0 5.28 1 0.46 2193.37 9 0
Poland 81 0.14 0.20 0.59 8.48 0.52 0.12 0.93 0.09 -0.42 3.15 0.48 0.50 0.14 0 3.56 1 0.42 12881.95 14 0
Portugal 259 0.43 0.57 0.62 7.04 0.29 0.04 0.83 0.10 -0.99 1.77 0.70 1.74 0.25 0 -0.72 1 0.42 22665.28 11 0
Qatar 66 0.30 0.26 0.72 7.53 0.36 0.08 1.40 0.89 -1.25 3.74 0.87 0.42 0.21 0 12.65 0 0.11 80995.32 18 1
Romania 24 0.15 0.25 0.67 7.17 0.63 0.11 0.91 0.11 0.20 5.64 0.67 0.43 0.01 0 1.77 1 0.45 8858.46 10 0
Russia 264 0.25 0.29 0.61 7.79 0.55 0.13 1.21 0.73 1.03 8.82 0.14 0.45 0.42 0 2.68 1 0.43 11755.36 12 1
Saudi Arabia 660 0.22 0.17 0.44 6.23 0.48 0.10 1.87 0.89 0.09 5.18 0.54 0.39 0.75 0 5.53 0 0.15 20568.45 17 1
Singapore 109 0.22 0.17 0.64 8.85 0.28 0.11 1.51 0.18 -2.19 3.46 0.91 1.04 1.26 1 5.72 0 0.22 47034.86 21 0
Slovak Republic 30 0.14 0.27 0.52 5.93 0.48 0.04 0.64 0.08 -0.19 2.60 0.87 0.43 0.00 0 2.73 1 0.49 17324.99 16 0
Slovenia 35 0.31 0.45 0.61 7.66 0.52 0.09 0.95 0.09 -0.88 2.59 0.71 0.84 0.02 0 0.08 1 0.34 24288.74 17 0
South Africa 181 0.18 0.14 0.66 8.11 0.38 0.16 1.90 0.40 -0.05 6.59 0.99 1.47 0.68 1 2.51 0 0.32 6836.64 13 1
Spain 176 0.35 0.39 0.70 9.57 0.32 0.09 1.20 0.09 -1.00 2.20 0.80 1.94 0.92 0 -0.62 1 0.52 31572.59 17 0
Sweden 147 0.26 0.22 0.73 9.02 0.22 0.12 1.62 0.12 -2.27 1.45 0.43 1.27 0 1.04 1 0.53 54909.39 21 0
Switzerland 161 0.21 0.16 0.70 9.58 0.22 0.12 1.70 0.07 -2.13 0.39 0.44 1.60 1.61 0 1.71 1 0.29 76388.7 21 0
Tanzania 20 0.05 0.04 0.36 4.90 0.60 0.30 1.48 0.26 0.62 10.15 0.53 0.12 1 6.67 1 0.44 754.68 0
Thailand 2320 0.22 0.25 0.32 4.82 0.38 0.09 1.17 0.07 0.33 2.72 0.88 1.30 0.56 0 3.51 1 0.36 5062.82 13 0
Tunisia 159 0.20 0.21 0.32 4.17 0.31 0.07 1.43 0.17 0.14 4.34 0.75 0.68 0.03 0 3.15 0 0.62 4186.31 11 0
Turkey 519 0.23 0.25 0.44 6.85 0.30 0.08 1.24 0.09 -0.09 8.08 0.90 0.48 0.46 0 3.59 1 0.42 10099.74 9 0
Ukraine 130 0.15 0.19 0.45 6.64 0.40 0.06 1.01 0.13 0.95 10.27 0.69 0.76 0.01 0 0.71 1 0.56 3407.46 7 0
United Arab E. 103 0.18 0.25 0.41 7.00 0.38 0.07 0.96 0.66 -1.09 0.59 0.68 0.13 0 2.73 0 0.14 39990.78 18 1
United Kingdom 572 0.26 0.23 0.78 9.36 0.33 0.11 1.46 0.16 -1.64 3.03 0.44 1.81 1.08 1 0.69 1 0.35 41923.26 21 0
United States 2863 0.24 0.20 0.80 9.29 0.27 0.12 1.73 0.12 -1.31 2.09 0.34 1.92 2.51 1 1.06 1 0.41 49458.28 19 0
Venezuela, RB 22 0.11 0.25 0.45 6.17 0.41 0.04 0.49 0.92 1.14 28.93 0.47 0.23 0 2.81 1 0.59 10719.08 7 1
Vietnam 1508 0.27 0.36 0.29 3.61 0.22 0.07 0.95 0.14 0.60 11.57 0.47 0.99 0.11 0 5.85 1 0.38 1457.95 8 0
Variables:“Book leverage” − Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to total assets; “Market leverage” − Total long- and short-term interest bearing debt to 
market value of the firm; “Maturity” − Long-term debt total debt;  “Size” − Natural logarithm of assets in US dollars, millions; “Tangibility” − Fixed assets to total assets; 
“Profitability” − Cash from operations to total assets; “Market-to-book” − Market value to total assets; "Mineral exports" − Mineral exports share of total merchandise 
exports; “Corruption” − Corruption, high value indicates more corrupt, “CPI” − Consumer price inflation, %, year-on-year; “Concentration” − The share of assets of the three 
largest banks of total bank assets; “Private credit” − Domestic credit to private sector, % of GDP; “Market activity” − Stock market turnover, % of GDP; "Common law" − 
Binary variable with 1=common law legal origins; “GDP growth” − Annual real GDP growth rate, %; “GDP/cap, USD” − Per capita GDP in USD; "Deposit insurance" − Binary 
variable for deposit insurance with 1=deposit insurance scheme; “Profit tax” − Profit tax, % of commercial profits; "Rating" − S&P country credit rating in numeric scale; 
"Resource country" − Binary variable with 1=Resource-dependent country.
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4 Oil price collapse and firm leverage in resource-
dependent countries  
4.1 Introduction 
In the recent past, we have seen an oil price collapse twice, the first time in 2008 in conjunction 
with the global financial crisis, and the second time in 2014 due to several factors related to 
both the demand and supply of oil. These periods have caused severe economic challenges for 
countries dependent on the production and export of mineral resources. In this study, we look 
for a financial channel between oil price volatility and the resource curse by using micro-level 
data. As suggested by Gilbert and Mork (1986), oil price changes cause some costly resource 
reallocation. That could be particularly harmful for the non-resource related sectors in 
resource-dependent economies and thus enhance the resource curse. 
Along with the rest of the economy, the financial sector in resource-dependent countries 
is expected to face distress following a drop in commodity prices. Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997) show that a credit crunch, collateral squeeze and savings squeeze all lead to flight to 
quality in lending. We have at least two types of tightening of capital in our time period. First, 
the financial crisis in 2008-2009 caused a global credit crunch.  Second, due to the decline in 
oil price in 2008 and 2014, resource firms experienced a collateral squeeze, which could have 
a significant effect for the whole banking sector in countries with a very large resource sector. 
According to Bernanke, Gertler et al. (1996), borrowers who face significant agency costs of 
borrowing are likely to bear the brunt of an economic downturn. In practice, smaller, younger 
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and less capitalized firms are the first to suffer from a credit crunch. This “flight to quality” is 
associated with a reduction in overall economic activity (Lang and Nakamura 1995). 
We expect that, as the end product prices of commodity producers decline, these firms 
will gradually reduce investments and borrowing. Lower commodity prices also make 
resource firms riskier for lenders.  On the one hand, that could lead to banks preferring other 
borrowers and supporting non-resource sectors in the economy. On the other hand, large and 
tangible resource firms might be considered by banks to be safe borrowers even during a 
financial distress, especially in resource-dependent countries despite the low commodity 
prices. Whether this flight-to-quality effect dominates is an empirical question which we 
address in this paper. 
Based on previous theoretical and empirical literature, we present two hypotheses: 
1) A sharp decline in commodity price has an adverse effect on the borrowing of 
the resource firms in all the countries. 
2) In resource-dependent countries, a collapse in the oil price causes a significant 
collateral squeeze to the banking sector, leading to flight to quality in lending. Consequently, 
non-resource sectors face the adverse effect in borrowing as well. 
We test these hypotheses empirically, using annual firm-level data from 65 different 
countries for the period 2005-2015, including approximately 3000 non-financial firms. Using 
difference-in-differences methodology, we show evidence of reallocation of financial 
resources following the oil price collapses in 2008 and 2014. We present empirical evidence 
that, in resource-dependent countries, not only resource firms but other firms as well reduce 
their borrowing after a collapse in oil price. The results suggest that oil price volatility harms 
economic diversification in resource-dependent countries through a financial channel. 
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 introduces the related 
literature. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
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4.2 Oil price volatility and financial channel in the previous 
literature 
Using microeconomic data to explain macroeconomic fluctuations has recently gained 
popularity due to greatly improved data availability (e.g. Mian, Sufi 2010).  To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to provide firm-level empirical evidence on changes in firm 
borrowing in resource-dependent countries following an oil price collapse. Our contribution 
to the previous literature is twofold. We present evidence that following a major decline in oil 
price, the fall in outstanding debt is more severe for resource firms in resource-dependent 
countries than in other countries. Further, we show that, while in non-resource-dependent 
countries only the resource firms reduce their leverage, in resource-dependent countries the 
other sectors follow as well. These results suggest that firm finance might play a part in 
hampering economic diversification in resource-dependent countries, thus enhancing the 
resource curse. 
There is a relatively extensive branch of empirical literature that shows the adverse effect 
of the oil price on economic growth, equity returns or industry growth (Hamilton 1983, 
Nandha, Faff 2008, Lee, Ni 2002, Scholtens, Yurtsever 2012). Although the relationship is 
positive for resource firms and commodity producing countries, the negative effect on other 
industries and countries outweighs the benefits for oil producers in a global perspective (IEA 
2004).  
Asymmetry in the reaction to oil price has been detected by Mork (1989), showing that 
the negative effects of a rise in oil price are greater than the positive effects followed by a 
decline in price. The rationale of Gilbert and Mork (1986) is that, while price movements up 
and down have opposite and symmetric effects on the production possibility frontier, any oil 
price change causes some costly resource reallocation. 
Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) argue that the resource curse or the development 
failure of resource abundant countries is caused by the volatility in commodity prices. They 
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show that, controlling for the volatility, resource wealth supports growth and that a developed 
financial sector can mitigate the price shocks. We take this finding to the firm level and detect 
whether a rapid fall in commodity prices causes reallocation of financial resources. 
Khwaja and Mian (2008) present empirical evidence from an emerging market that large 
firms are twice hedged from liquidity shocks occurring in the financial sector. Banks reduce 
lending less to large firms, and large firms also have alternative borrowing channels. However, 
a global credit crunch creates an environment where alternative sources of financing can be 
limited for large firms as well. According to evidence from syndicated loans, the flight home 
effect reduces the availability of loans even for good borrowers, as banks withdraw to their 
home markets (Giannetti, Laeven 2012). Using evidence from Russia, Fungáčová, Herrala et 
al. (2013) show that foreign-owned banks reduced lending more than other banks during the 
2008-2009 financial crisis. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that even large firms with 
access to public credit markets are susceptible to fluctuations in the supply of capital. Due to 
worsening investor sentiment, bond issues could also become less available for firms. 
Deterioration in investor sentiment can further reduce the availability of bank loans, as 
securitization becomes harder for banks (Shleifer, Vishny 2010). Zeitun, Temimi et al. (2016) 
argue, based on empirical evidence from CCG countries, that corporate capital structure was 
determined based on demand prior to the financial crisis in 2008, whereas after the crisis the 
supply side, i.e. banks, has increased in importance. 
Despite the collateral squeeze caused by the decline in commodity prices, resource firms 
may well remain quality borrowers. Kurronen (2016), using micro-level data, shows that 
resource firms on average have less debt and a higher level of tangible assets than other firms, 
which could suggest that resource firms are prepared for the fluctuations in commodity prices 
by conservative leverage levels.  
There is a rapidly growing branch of literature on the effects of the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis on firm capital structure. With US data, Harrison and Widjaja (2014) show that the role 
of assets tangibility increased after the financial crisis as a determinant for leverage. Using 
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data from Western Europe, Iqbal and Kume (2014) show that firm leverage ratios first 
increased during the financial crisis but decreased again after the crisis. However, the effects 
of the recent financial crisis on resource-dependent countries has received very limited 
attention. 
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
Our firm data is from Bloomberg, from which we have gathered financial data from the 
companies included in the main equity indices of 73 countries in 2005-2015. The equity 
indices used are listed in Appendix 9. For the United States, we use the firms included in the 
S&P500 index. We limit the data to non-financial firms. We remove firms with missing values 
on debt or assets. We also remove observations from countries that do not have information 
on their fuel and metal exports for any of the years in our sample, as we are not able to 
determine their resource dependence. Country-specific variables are from The World Bank 
DataBank. 
As the variable of interest we use annual real change in the amount of outstanding short- 
and long-term interest-bearing debt of a firm relative to the start period total assets. We use 
consumer price inflation (CPI) to deflate the nominal change in the debt amount. Although 
CPI is not a perfect measure of changes in price level, it is the most available one. We use the 
change in the amount of debt rather than the debt level, as Lemmon and Roberts (2010) have 
shown that the debt levels do not react strongly to changes in the supply of capital, since firms 
reduce investments accordingly. Moreover, using the current period assets in debt ratios would 
not give meaningful results, as the value of those assets for resource firms is changed due to 
the oil price drop and the effects on the amount of debt would not be visible. 
As controls we use firm-specific variables which previous literature has shown to be 
important for firm leverage (see e.g. Titman and Wessels 1988; Rajan and Zingales 1995). We 
use the ratio of the firm’s property, plant, and equipment to total assets as a measure of the 
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firm’s tangibility, and we use the market-to-book ratio as a control for growth opportunities. 
Firm size is measured by the logarithm of total assets in US dollars and profitability by cash 
from operations to total assets, as that describes a firm’s capability to generate cash to finance 
investments. We also use the book leverage to control for the leverage level. We trim the firm 
variables, removing observations that are more than four median absolute deviations from the 
median14. This reduces the risk of outliers or errors in the data driving the results, but it only 
removes clear outliers and not systematically the tails of the distribution, which might contain 
valuable information.   
Based on GISC classification, we define resource firms as firms with the sector name 
“Energy” or the industry name “Metals & Mining”.  However, we exclude the sub-industry 
“Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing” from the energy sector, as Lee and Ni (2002) show that, 
contrary to the energy sector in general, the refining industry, which uses commodities as an 
input, is adversely affected by the rise in the price of oil.  Resource-dependent countries are 
those where the share of metals and fuels (later minerals) in total exports exceeds 40% on 
average during the sample period. 15 Descriptive statistics of key variables and their 
correlation matrix are presented in Table 16. The variables are described in more detail in 
Appendix 10. 
                                                   
14 We limit the maximum amount of trimmed observations to 1.5% for each variable. Consequently, 
for the real change in debt we increase the multiplier from 4 to 10, as it has a peaked distribution.  
15 In our sample, resource-dependent countries are: Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the 
United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. 
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Table 16. Upper panel: Descriptive statistics of selected variables. Lower panel: Pearson correlation coefficient 
(lower triangle) and corresponding p-values (upper triangle) 
 
 
Oil price developments for 2005-2015 are depicted in Figure 2. Two major price falls 
occurred during the sample period, the first one during the second half of 2008 and the second 
during the second half of 2014. However, the reasons behind the price declines were quite 
different. In 2008 the fall started due to deteriorating global growth outlook, but accelerated 
in September after the bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers initiated a global financial crisis. In 
2014, the demand for oil was subdued, mostly due to slowing growth in China, but no major 
recession was in sight. Simultaneously, the supply of oil continued to increase due to US shale 
oil investments, the re-entrance of Iran to the market and increasing stability in Libya. 
Consequently, the supply of oil exceeded demand (IEA 2016). Moreover, neither the oil cartel 
Descriptive statitistics
N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Real change in debt 33 364 0.02 0.1 -0.52 0 0.52
Size 39 654 9 508 30 617 0 1 193 877 551
Profitability 38 792 0.09 0.09 -0.22 0.08 0.38
Tangibility 35 536 0.35 0.24 0 0.31 1
Market-to-book 35 932 0.14 0.64 -2.27 0.06 2.39
Book leverage 38 994 0.24 0.18 0 0.23 1.02
GDP/cap USD 36 175 23 584 21 514 446 14 582 116 613
GDP growth 36 183 3.63 3.65 -14.81 3.35 27.5
CPI 39 451 4.05 4.01 -4.86 3.04 62.17
Corruption 36 184 0.44 1.05 -1.38 0.09 2.55
Resource firm 39 889 0.16 0.36 0 0 1
Resource country 39 889 0.16 0.37 0 0 1
Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Real change in debt 0.13 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.70 0.06 0.00 0.58
2 Size 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 Profitability -0.20 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
4 Tangibility 0.00 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Market-to-book 0.06 -0.08 0.37 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
6 Book leverage 0.21 0.06 -0.24 0.19 -0.11 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00
7 GDP/cap USD -0.01 0.24 0.10 -0.12 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 GDP growth 0.08 -0.13 -0.03 0.03 0.16 -0.03 -0.44 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
9 CPI 0.00 -0.15 -0.04 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.49 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.00
10 Corruption -0.01 0.22 0.10 -0.10 0.11 0.00 0.88 -0.44 -0.54 0.00 0.00
11 Resource firm 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.00
12 Resource country 0.00 -0.09 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.11 0.08 0.15 -0.02 0.04
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficient in lower triangle and corresponding p-values in the upper triangle.Variables: “Real change in debt”: 
Real annual change in short and long term interest bearing debt divided by the start of the period assets;“Size”: Natural logarithm of 
assets in US dollars, millions;  “Profitability”: Cash from operations to total assets; “Tangibility”: Fixed assets to total assets; “Market-to-
book”: Market value to total assets;  “Book leverage”: Total long and short term interest bearing debt to total assets;  “GDP/cap USD”: 
GDP per capita in US dollars;   “GDP growth”: Annual real GDP growth rate, %;  “CPI”: Consumer price inflation, %, year-on-year;  
“Corruption”: Corruption, high value indicates less corrupt;"Resource firm": Binary variable for 1=resource firm; "Resource country": Binary 
variable with 1=Resource-dependent country.
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OPEC nor other big producers showed any interest in limiting the supply of oil despite the fall 
in prices. Metals prices declined at a much more moderate pace than the oil price, which 
indicates that supply issues mattered more in the oil price decline in 2014 (Baumeister, Kilian 
2016). All in all, the fall in oil price in 2014 improved the global economic outlook, as the 
economic growth in most countries is supported by lower energy prices. As the price falls 
were so large and rapid in our sample period, the “normal” time periods consist mostly of 
rising or relatively stable prices. That should amplify the effect we find following a sudden 
price shock.  
Even though we study the effects of the oil price change, the strong co-movement of oil 
and many other commodities warrants our broader definition of resources, which is energy 
and metals. Prices of both energy and industrial commodities react to global business cycles 
(Barsky, Kilian 2002).  Ohashi and Okimoto (2016) show that, due to financialization of 
commodities, there has been an increasing trend of excess co-movement in commodities since 
2000. 
 
Figure 2 Brent crude oil price in 2005-2015 
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Data limitations are well known in empirical studies on liquidity shocks. As Khwaja and 
Mian (2008) discuss, due to the lack of links between banks and individual firms over time, 
it is difficult to separate the effect of a shock on bank lending and on firm borrowing. We 
approach this issue from the firm’s side and compare the change in leverage of four groups 
of firms: resource and non-resource firms based on their location in resource or non-
resource-dependent countries. 
Table 17  presents the descriptive statistics for these four groups of firms, showing strong 
heterogeneity. Firms in resource countries are smaller than in other countries, especially 
non-resource firms. The market-to-book ratio is higher in resource countries, and resource 
firms are more tangible than other firms. Interestingly, the GDP per capita is higher in 
resource countries than in other countries in our data.  
We have annual data, which does not allow very detailed analysis of changes in firm 
leverage. In particular, immediately after the start of the global financial crisis, some firms 
might have used their existing credit facilities to insure their liquidity even without an actual 
need for debt. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show evidence of such behavior by US firms 
during late 2008.  Due to data limitations, we nevertheless focus on what happened during the 
next 1-2 years after the fall in oil prices. As shown by e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), it takes 
time for firms to adjust their lending after a downturn. This is also shown by Iqbal and Kume 
(2014), using data on Western European countries around the time of the financial crisis in 
2008-2009. Based on a large sample of empirical studies, Jones et al. (2004) also show the 
largest impacts of oil prices on output in the 3rd and 4th, and even later, following quarters, 
so a one-to-two-year lag is expected to give reasonable results.  
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      The averages of the dependent variable, real change in debt, are depicted in Figure 3 for 
firms in resource and non-resource-dependent countries with a 95% confidence interval. It 
seems that the reaction in 2009 was much stronger for firms in resource-dependent countries 
than in other countries. Moreover, after the oil price collapse in 2014, debt growth seems to 
have accelerated in non-resource countries but decelerated in resource countries, as expected 
based on previous knowledge about the effects of oil price fluctuations. 
 
Figure 3. Real change in debt and 95% confidence intervals shown for firms in resource-dependent and other 
countries 
 
 
4.3.2 Methodology 
We use difference-in-differences (DiD) regression to disclose whether the real change in debt 
was different for firms in resource countries (the treatment group) than for firms in other 
countries (the control group) during the years immediately after after a commodity price drop. 
Next, we estimate the regressions separately for resource-dependent and other countries and 
look for evidence of whether the change in debt was different for resource firms (the treatment 
group) and other firms (the control group). Our motivation is to determine whether the fall 
seen in change in debt in Figure 3 is due to resource firms or whether other sectors follow. 
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Difference-in-differences is a quasi-experimental approach well suited to estimating the 
effects of a sudden exogenous change in the economic environment (Angrist, Krueger 1999). 
The key assumption is that, without the shock (the oil price collapse), the treatment and control 
groups would have had a similar development path, i.e. parallel growth trends. Before 
proceeding to regressions, we make sure that the parallel trend assumption holds for the two 
pre-crisis periods by testing the similarity in growth rates of the dependent variable. 
The difference-in-differences regression equation becomes 
 ??????= ??+?????????????? ? ???????????? ? ?????????? ? ???????????? ? ????? ? 
????????????????????????? ? ?????????? ? ??????????????????????? ? ????? ? 
??+??+?? ? ??????? ? ???? , 
where i,j,k and t are the indexes of firm, country, industry and year, respectively. Yijkt is the 
real change in debt of firm i, country j, industry k and year t. ???????????? is the indicator 
function, which receives the value 1 if the observation belongs to the treatment group, and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, indicator functions ?????????? ? ?????????? and ?????????? ? ????? 
indicate whether the observation is from the post-shock years 2009-2010 or 2015, 
respectively. ??????????????????????? ? ?????????? and ????????????????????? ? ????? 
are the difference-in-differences terms indicating whether the observation belongs to both the 
treatment group and the post-shock years.  ??  is the country fixed effect, ??  is the industry 
fixed effect and ?? is the year effect. ??????? presents the firm-specific one-period lagged 
variables, and ????  is the random disturbance. 
The main interest in the difference-in-differences estimator here lies in the coefficients ?? 
and ?? which are the differences in post-treatment differences between the treatment and 
control groups. They describe whether the treatment group’s reaction to the shock is different 
from that of the control group. The interpretation of the other key parameters is the following: 
?? is the pre-treatment coefficient for the control group, and ?? is the pre-treatment difference 
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of the treatment group from the control group. ?? and ?? are the post-treatment differences of 
the coefficient for the control groups from their pre-treatment coefficients. 
Our choice for using two years to indicate the post-shock period after the beginning of the 
financial crisis in 2008 is data-driven, as the negative effect seems to carry on to 2010 despite 
the oil price recovery. However, we also test the regressions while limiting the post-crisis 
years to 2009 and 2015, and the results are similar but slightly weaker. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Matching 
Due to heterogeneous groups (Table 17) we follow the approach of Lemmon and Roberts 
(2010) and use nearest neighbor propensity score matching, introduced by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983), to determine the appropriate control group for each of our treatment groups in 
the pre-shock period of 2006-2008. Each treatment group with their corresponding control 
group is listed in Table 18. 
Table 18. Treatment and control groups 
 
The goal of this nonparametric preprocessing approach is to adjust the data prior to the 
parametric analysis in order to reduce or even eliminate the relationship between the 
treatment group and the independent variables without causing bias or too much 
inefﬁciency. In our case, for example, resource firms are smaller in resource-dependent 
countries than elsewhere. That is, the treatment group (resource firms in resource countries) 
is linked to the independent variable (firm size). As we cannot know the true relationship 
between the treatment group and independent variables, we need to make strong 
assumptions when choosing the parametric model. The goal of the preprocessing of the data 
Treatment Control
(1) Resource firms in resource countries Resource firms in non-resource countries
(2) Non-resource firms in resource countries Non-resource firms in non-resource countries
(3) Resource firms in resource countries Non-resource firms in resource countries
(4) Resource firms in non-resource countries Non-resource firms in non-resource countries
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by sample matching is to eliminate the model dependence of the later parametric 
estimations. To be clear, matching does not mean pairing observations, but distributions 
need to be matched as closely as possible. Even if some relationship remained between the 
treatment group and the independent variables, the procedure can greatly reduce the model 
dependence, which is a valuable feature given that we have no knowledge of the true 
parametric model. (See thorough discussion on propensity score matching in Ho, Imai et al. 
(2007)).  
The matching begins with a logit regression with the binary variable indicating whether a 
firm is located in a resource country (pairs (2) and (3) in Table 18) or whether the firm is a 
resource firm (pairs (1) and (4)). That is, we have four logit regressions to find the best possible 
control group for our treatment groups. Given that the pool of control firms is significantly 
larger than the treatment group in all of the four cases, we choose two control firms for each 
treatment firm. We use matching with replacement, meaning that each control firm can be 
matched to more than one treatment firm. The matching process also drops firms when they 
fall outside the support range of the distance score before matching, which reduces the effect 
of outliers. In the four cases, 2-11 treatment firms are dropped, or a maximum of 3.6 % (Table 
19). 
First, we want the parallel trend assumption to be satisfied in the pre-shock era, so we 
include the growth in the change in real debt in the matching process. To be specific, we do 
not include the dependent variable of our later parametric regressions, but only its growth rate. 
In addition to that, we include the control variables of firm size, profitability, tangibility and 
market-to-book ratio, which are the most commonly used explanatory variables for firm 
leverage. We also use book leverage as a firm-specific control variable, as we expect the 
leverage level to be an important determinant for debt growth. Further, we look for matches 
from within a country and industry, so we include these fixed effects. When looking for the 
control group for firms in resource-dependent countries from non-resource countries, country 
fixed effects is not feasible, but we use binary variables indicating whether the country is 
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developed16 and whether it has a developed banking sector (above median in our sample). We 
also include the level of corruption as a country-specific control variable, as it has been shown 
to be an important determinant for firm leverage (Fan, Titman et al. 2012). We use pre-shock 
era (2006-2008) averages of our variables in the matching process. 
Propensity score matching considerably reduces the relationship between the treatment 
group and the independent variables in our data, but it does not remove it completely. Thus, 
model dependence is not totally eliminated with the matching process in this case. Propensity 
score matching results in Table 19 and corresponding logit regressions before and after 
matching in Table 20 show that firm size, market-to-book ratio and tangibility remain 
significant in some of the post-matching logit regressions. Moreover, a country’s income level 
and the development level of the banking sector remain significant for the sample of non-
resource firms in Table 20’s post-match regression (2).  Consequently, we will continue to 
include these variables in the parametric regressions with the matched sample by using 
country fixed effects instead of development indicators. The mean difference for real change 
in debt growth between the treatment and control groups increased in group (2) in Table 19. 
However, the group means remain economically similar, and the Wilcoxon test with the null 
hypothesis that the groups have the same median cannot be rejected (p-value 0.91), verifying 
that the parallel trend assumption also holds in this case. 
It worth noting that, despite these shortcomings, most of the variable coefficients are not 
only insignificant but also clearly smaller in the post-match logit regressions, indicating that 
the improvement is not merely due to the decrease in degrees of freedom. Also, industry and 
country fixed effects are no longer significant in the post-match regressions, although not 
reported in the table. Despite the fact that not all variables in the treatment group are well 
matched, the Pseudo-R2 has dropped considerably. In sum, the matching process has greatly 
                                                   
16 Classification is based on World Bank world income ranking in 2008, and developed countries are 
the ones belonging to the high income group according to the World Bank classification. 
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reduced the differences in the variables between the treatment and control groups and has also 
insured that the parallel trend assumption holds. 
Next, we test whether we can also use these matched firms in the later event. We conduct 
a two-sided Wilcoxon test for the matched treatment and control groups to verify the parallel 
trend assumption for the 2012-2014 period. All the tests reported in Table 21 fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of a similar trend, and we can pursue difference-in-differences regression for 
the whole sample period with our matched firms. 
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Table 19. Propensity score matching results 
 
 
 
Means 
treated
Means 
control
Mean 
differe
nce
%-balance 
improvement 
in mean 
difference
Means 
treated
Means 
control
Mean 
differe
nce
%-balance 
improvement 
in mean 
difference
Real change in debt growth 0.000 0.003 -0.003 75.2 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 -48.8
Size 6.494 6.797 -0.304 49.0 6.011 6.057 -0.046 96.0
Profitability 0.091 0.079 0.013 21.9 0.102 0.103 -0.002 80.2
Market-to-book 0.225 0.131 0.094 -14.5 0.238 0.240 -0.002 98.6
Tangibility 0.391 0.373 0.017 82.9 0.364 0.356 0.008 85.0
Book leverage 0.231 0.220 0.011 -46.1 0.217 0.222 -0.004 88.3
Developed 0.682 0.677 0.006 93.6 0.642 0.619 0.023 74.2
Developed banks 0.471 0.482 -0.012 94.5 0.247 0.236 0.011 96.9
Corruption 0.881 0.896 -0.016 84.1 0.470 0.561 -0.091 -4.2
All Obs 88 309 330 1876
Matched 85 112 324 386
Means 
treated
Means 
control
Mean 
differe
nce
%-balance 
improvement 
in mean 
difference
Means 
treated
Means 
control
Mean 
differe
nce
%-balance 
improvement 
in mean 
difference
Real change in debt growth 0.006 0.010 -0.004 60.3 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 28.8
Size 6.435 6.564 -0.129 70.9 7.016 7.104 -0.088 23.7
Profitability 0.090 0.095 -0.005 64.4 0.103 0.096 0.008 36.8
Market-to-book 0.239 0.280 -0.041 -55.9 0.142 0.122 0.021 64.1
Tangibility 0.383 0.401 -0.018 -5.7 0.472 0.475 -0.003 98.5
Book leverage 0.230 0.234 -0.004 73.2 0.224 0.234 -0.010 67.0
All Obs 88 330 309 1876
Matched 86 107 298 394
(3) (4)
Variables: “Real change in debt growth”: Growth of real annual change in short and long term interest bearing debt divided 
by the start of the period assets;“Size”: Natural logarithm of assets in US dollars, millions;  “Profitability”: Cash from 
operations to total assets; “Tangibility”: Fixed assets to total assets; “Market-to-book”: Market value to total assets;  “Book 
leverage”: Total long and short term interest bearing debt to total assets;  “Developed”: Binary variable with value 1 if the 
country is a high income country in 2008 based on World Bank classification and 0 otherwise;   “Developed banks”: Binary 
variable with value 1 if bank credit to private sector/GDP is above median in our sample, 0 otherwise;   “Corruption”: 
Corruption, high value indicates less corrupt.
Resource firms in resource vs. non-
resource countries
Non-resource firms in resource vs. non-
resource countries
Resource vs. non-resource firms in 
resource countries
Resource vs. non-resource firms in non-
resource countries
(1) (2)
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Table 20. Logit regressions before and after matching 
 
 
 
 
Pre-
match
Post-
match
Pre-
match
Post-
match
Pre-
match
Post-
match
Pre-
match
Post-match
Real change in debt growth 1.391 -0.624 -0.026 0.299 1.51 0.279 -0.503 -0.3
(1.31) (1.54) (0.81) (0.96) (1.42) (1.62) (0.88) (1.07)
Size -0.018 -0.018 -0.259*** -0.112*** -0.196** -0.064 -0.113*** -0.023
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04)
Profitability -1.115 1.013 -2.203** -1.299 -2.790* -0.678 -0.351 0.654
(1.69) (1.95) (1.07) (1.20) (1.66) (1.78) (1.17) (1.31)
Market-to-book 0.371 0.389 0.876*** 0.281* -0.18 -0.138 -0.05 -0.026
(0.26) (0.31) (0.14) (0.16) (0.28) (0.31) (0.15) (0.17)
Tangibility -1.463** -0.524 1.145*** 0.349 1.199* -0.288 3.419*** 1.267***
(0.62) (0.72) (0.38) (0.43) (0.67) (0.76) (0.33) (0.39)
Book leverage 0.706 0.959 -1.058** -0.564 0.475 0.894 -2.270*** -0.907
(0.89) (1.10) (0.47) (0.56) (0.95) (1.10) (0.49) (0.58)
Developed banks -1.878*** -0.491 -1.939*** -0.554**
(0.40) (0.51) (0.19) (0.24)
Developed 1.020* 0.282 1.439*** 0.684***
(0.56) (0.63) (0.21) (0.24)
Corruption 0.332 0.016 0.274** 0.042
(0.28) (0.30) (0.11) (0.13)
Constant -0.711 -0.441 -15.477 0.536 0.599 0.41 -1.519 14.221
(0.58) (0.70) (766.09) (0.77) (0.66) (0.73) (1.25) (882.74)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes no no no no
Country fixed effects no no no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 397 197 2 206 710 418 193 2 185 692
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.02 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.24 0.05
Akaike Inf. Crit. 393 289 1558 1043 401 298 1537 993
Resource firm
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Variables: “Real change in debt growth”: Growth of real annual change in short and 
long term interest bearing debt divided by the start of the period assets;“Size”: Natural logarithm of assets in US dollars, 
millions;  “Profitability”: Cash from operations to total assets; “Tangibility”: Fixed assets to total assets; “Market-to-
book”: Market value to total assets;  “Book leverage”: Total long and short term interest bearing debt to total assets;  
“Developed”: Binary variable with value 1 if the country is a high income country in 2008 based on World Bank 
classification and 0 otherwise;   “Developed banks”: Binary variable with value 1 if bank credit to private sector/GDP is 
above median in our sample, 0 otherwise;   “Corruption”: Corruption, high value indicates less corrupt.
Dependent variable:Dependent variable:
Resource country
Resource firms Non-resource firms Resource countries Non-resource countries
(3) (4)(1) (2)
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Table 21. Wilcoxon test for parallel trends in 2012-2014 for the matched sample 
 
 
4.4.2 Difference-in-differences 
Difference-in-differences results in Table 22 show that resource firms and firms in 
resource-dependent countries fared worse after an oil price shock than their counterparts in 
non-resource industries or non-resource countries. Our main interest in these regressions lies 
in the DiD coefficients for 2009-2010 and 2015. 
Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 22 compare firm performance in resource-dependent 
countries to that in other countries. In regression (1) the DiD coefficients are negative and also 
statistically significant for the 2009-2010 crisis, indicating that the resource firms in resource-
dependent countries reduced the amount of outstanding debt after the oil price shock. For the 
resource firms in non-resource countries, the change was close to zero, which is shown by the 
crisis year dummies in regression (1). Similarly, non-resource firms experienced stronger 
reduction in debt if they were located in a resource-dependent country (column (2)).  
When looking at the relative performance of resource firms vs. non-resource firms within 
a country group in columns (3) and (4), we can conclude that both resource and non-resource 
firms performed poorly in resource-dependent countries. In contrast, in non-resource countries 
the resource-sector reduced its leverage significantly more than the non-resource sector in 
2015, when the oil price collapse was not accompanied by a global financial crisis. We also 
verify the results with a non-matched sample and find the results robust.17 
                                                   
17 The regression results for the unmatched sample are available on request. 
2012-2014
Treatment Mean Control Mean
Wilcoxon 
p-value
(1) Resource firms in resource countries -0.014 Resource firms in non-resource countries -0.008 0.299
(2) Non-resource firms in resource countries -0.003 Non-resource firms in non-resource countries -0.002 0.761
(3) Resource firms in resource countries -0.014 Non-resource firms in resource countries -0.003 0.188
(4) Resource firms in non-resource countries -0.008 Non-resource firms in non-resource countries -0.002 0.836
Wilcoxon two sample test with null hypothesis that the samples are from population with the same median. The tested 
variable is the average growth rate of real change in debt of the firms.
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Table 22. Difference-in-differences regression results for matched samples 
 
 
Our results suggest that the oil price collapse harms the leverage growth of both resource 
and non-resource firms in resource-dependent countries. Based on these results, we cannot, 
however, tell whether the non-resource sector merely reduces its demand for debt due to the 
worsened growth opportunities or whether the supply of debt plays a role too. 
 
4.4.3 The role of banks 
To detect whether the supply of finance plays a role, we look into the firms in resource-
dependent countries in more detail, using a difference-in-differences approach without sample 
matching. We do not have data on the source of leverage of the firms, but we use the 
Treatment Resource firms in 
resource countries
Non-resource firms 
in resource 
countries
Resource firms in 
resource countries
Resource firms in 
non-resource 
countries
Control
Resource firms in 
non-resource 
countries
Non-resource firms 
in non-resource 
countries
Non-resource firms 
in resource 
countries
Non-resource firms 
in non-resource 
countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil crisis 09-10 0.006 -0.017** -0.028** -0.008
-0.014 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006
Oil crisis15 0.002 -0.016** -0.017 0.006
-0.013 -0.007 -0.015 -0.007
Resource country 0.003 0.032**
-0.006 -0.015
Resource firm -0.001 0.008***
-0.007 -0.003
DiD 2009-2010 -0.024* -0.014** 0.004 0.003
-0.013 -0.006 -0.013 -0.006
DiD 2015 -0.021 -0.013* -0.008 -0.024***
-0.015 -0.008 -0.016 -0.007
Constant 0.021** -0.024 0.031*** 0.009*
-0.01 -0.016 -0.01 -0.005
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1 754 5 978 1 644 6 275
Dependent variable:
Real change in debt
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by firm. Dependent variable: “Real change in debt”: 
Real annual change in short and long term interest bearing debt divided by the start of the period assets. Independent 
variables: "Oil crisis 09-10": Binary variable with value 1 if the observation is from year 2009 or 2010, 0 otherwise; "Oil crisis 
15": Binary variable with value 1 if the observation is from year 2015; "Resource firm": Binary variable for 1=resource firm; 
"Resource country": Binary variable with 1=Resource-dependent country.
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knowledge from previous literature that smaller firms tend to be more dependent on banks 
than bigger firms and that banks provide shorter maturity debt than capital markets (Gertler, 
Gilchrist 1994, Demirgüç-Kunt, Maksimovic 2002). Thus, we dummy out firms in resource-
dependent countries which are below the median by size in our sample, which have debt 
maturity below median and which had some amount of debt in 2007 and 2013 before the two 
crises. This classification yields 113 firms in the earlier period, and 149 in the later period, 
which we classify as bank-dependent. The reaction of these bank-dependent firms could reveal 
whether the domestic banking sector fared worse after the crises than international capital 
markets did. 
Similarly, we look for evidence of a flight-to-quality phenomenon. From previous 
literature we know that smaller, younger and less capitalized firms are the first to suffer from 
flight to quality, as banks find bigger and more tangible firms more attractive (Bernanke, 
Gertler et al. 1996). We dummy out firms in resource-dependent countries, firms which are 
bigger and more tangible than the median firm and which had an existing book leverage below 
the median in 2007 and 2013. This results in 49 and 55 firms for the earlier and later period, 
respectively, and we name these groups bank-attractive. We confirm that the parallel trend 
assumption holds (Table 23) where all the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of population 
with the same median. However, there is a clear difference in the mean values of the group in 
the second and third rows, a fact which could be economically significant. We will thus also 
use a matched sample later on to test the robustness of the regression results.  
Bank-attractive firms reduced their borrowing less than other firms in resource-dependent 
countries in the 2009 crisis (column (3) in Table 24), whereas for the later crisis the difference-
in-differences coefficient is close to zero. The results suggest a flight to quality in lending 
when the oil price collapse coincided with a global financial crisis. This result is in line with 
the theoretical underpinning that, in the event of a credit crunch, flight to quality leads to 
reallocation of financial resources, which favors bigger and more tangible firms with a strong 
balance sheet. However, although the coefficient is also positive for the difference-in-
 103 
 
differences term for 2015, it is very small and insignificant. Thus, we find no evidence that an 
oil price decline alone in late 2014 would have caused a similar reaction. In fact, when looking 
at the performance of bank-dependent firms in 2015 in column (2), it seems that they were 
better off than other firms in the resource-dependent countries after the collapse in oil price in 
2014, although the coefficient is not significant at the 10% level. That could indicate that 
financial resources from banks became more available when the oil price drop reduced the 
borrowing of resource firms. We verify the results, using a matched sample for the results in 
columns (2) and (3) in Table 24, and find the results robust.18 
 
Table 23. Wilcoxon test for bank-dependent and bank-attractive firms 
 
 
                                                   
18 These regression results, as well as the statistics on the matching procedure, are available on 
request. 
2006-2008
Treatment Mean Control Mean
Wilcoxon 
p-value
Bank-dependent firms in 
resource countries 0.002
Non-bank-dependent 
firms in resource 
countries
0.001 0.8396
Firms attractive for banks 
in resource countries
0.012
Firms not attractive for 
banks in resource 
countries
0.000 0.273
2012-2014
Treatment Mean Control Mean
Wilcoxon 
p-value
Bank-dependent firms in 
resource countries -0.018
Non-bank-dependent 
firms in resource 
countries
-0.008 0.4668
Firms attractive for banks 
in resource countries
-0.004
Firms not attractive for 
banks in resource 
countries
-0.011 0.4022
Wilcoxon two sample test with null hypothesis that the samples are from population 
with the same median. The tested variable is the average growth rate of real change 
in debt of the firms during the two periods: 2006-2008 and 2012-2014.
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Control variables in all regressions are, as expected, based on previous literature. Larger 
and more tangible firms and firms with higher market-to-book ratio have higher real debt 
growth rates, whereas more profitable firms and firms with a higher debt level have slower 
growth in debt. Our model captures only a relatively small part of the variance in leverage 
growth, which, however, is typical for leverage regressions on large firm data (see e.g. 
Lemmon, Roberts 2010). The results remain robust if we remove the shock years 2008 and 
2014 from the estimations, or if we only use the year 2009 as the first crisis indicator instead 
of the two-year period of 2009-2010. 
We must highlight that these results cannot be directly extrapolated, which is a 
shortcoming in the difference-in-differences approach and particularly relevant for the 
matched data. The results are valid for the used data and, although that data is extensive, small 
firms in the sample are small only among firms included in the main equity indices: unlisted 
small firms might face very different circumstances. That is, even the small firms in our 
sample might belong to the group of quality borrowers from the banks’ perspective.  
There is theoretical and empirical work as well as surveys to further support our results 
that supply frictions play a role in the contraction of firm borrowing after the oil price shocks 
in resource-dependent countries and that not all of the reaction can be attributed to demand 
factors. As the oil price drop and the global credit crunch cause a collateral squeeze in 
resource-dependent countries in particular, some reallocation of financial resources and flight 
to quality is expected (Holmstrom, Tirole 1997). Further, Beck (2011) uses survey data to 
argue that the availability of financing is an obstacle for firms in resource-dependent countries. 
Zeitun et al. (2016) show, from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) -countries, that credit 
supply constraints have been apparent after the financial crisis in 2008-2009.  
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Table 24. Difference-in-differences regression results for bank-dependent and bank-attractive firms 
 
 
There is a possibility that the regressions are biased due to endogeneity. However, we use 
country, industry and year fixed effects to reduce the risk of endogeneity rising from omitted 
variables. We use lagged values of control variables, which reduces the risk for 
contemporaneous correlation between the independent variables and the error term. Sample 
matching reduces the dependence on the parametric model chosen, but results are robust when 
using the whole unmatched data as well. 
Treatment Bank-dependent firms 
in 2007
Bank-dependent firms 
in 2013
Firms attractive for 
banks in 2007
Firms attractive for 
banks in 2013
Control
Non-bank-dependent 
firms in 2007
Non-bank-dependent 
firms in 2013
Firms not attractive 
for banks in 2007
Firms not attractive 
for banks in 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(lagassetsUSD) 0.002 0.006*** 0.004** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
lagprofitability -0.013 -0.038 -0.002 -0.034
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
lagtangibility 0.015 0.006 0.022 0.013
(0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012)
laglogmarkettobook 0.011** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
lagdebttoassets -0.128*** -0.076*** -0.141*** -0.088***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.023) (0.017)
oilcrisis0910 -0.033*** -0.039***
(0.009) (0.006)
oilcrisis15 -0.013** -0.008
(0.006) (0.006)
bank-dependent -0.001 0.005
(0.011) (0.006)
bank-attractive -0.032*** -0.030***
(0.012) (0.007)
D-i-D -0.011 0.018 0.023* 0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant -0.011 -0.026* -0.021 -0.028**
(0.028) (0.014) (0.028) (0.014)
Observations 1,821 2,125 1,844 2,131
R2 0.118 0.07 0.116 0.073
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors clustered by firm. Country, year and industry dummies included in all 
regressions.
Dependent variable:
Real change in debt
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All in all, the oil price drop causes negative growth in firm leverage in resource-dependent 
countries for all firms and in both crisis times in our sample. That supports the idea that there 
is a volatility curse (van der Ploeg, Poelhekke 2009), that volatility is a key channel of the 
resource curse and that the financial sector works as a part of that channel. Van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke (2009) further argue that a developed financial sector can mitigate the harmful 
effects of oil price volatility. Country fixed effects should capture the development level of 
the financial sector in our regression, given the relatively short time period we have.   
Our data also shows strong implications of bank distress after the beginning of the 
financial crisis in 2008, a fact which further supports our hypothesis that the supply of credit 
was particularly limited in resource-dependent countries. The chart on the left in Figure 4 
shows the share of non-performing loans for resource and non-resource countries weighted by 
the number of firms in each country in our sample. Non-performing loans increased (left 
chart), whereas net margin (middle chart) and return on equity (right chart) squeezed in both 
groups in our data, but more in the resource-dependent countries in 2009. Unfortunately, we 
do not yet have the figures for 2015. 
Figure 4. Financial sector was under distress during financial crisis 2008-2009 in resource-dependent countries 
 
 
Our sample consists only of firms included in the main equity index of each country. So, 
even though we do not find evidence that non-resource sectors in resource-dependent 
countries would have suffered more than resource firms from the oil price drop, the results are 
not even nearly exhaustive. It could be the case that large listed firms are all considered quality 
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borrowers in each economy, so that the firms suffering from the flight-to-quality or flight-to-
liquidity phenomenon in the economy are smaller and unlisted. However, the volatility of the 
oil price seems to affect the leverage of listed firms in resource-dependent countries, 
confirming that the financial sector is one channel though which the resource curse operates. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
We present the hypothesis that an oil price collapse hinders not only resource firms but also 
all firms in resource-dependent countries through a financial channel. We presume that the 
collateral squeeze in the financial sector following a drop in resource firms’ asset values leads 
to reduced lending by banks and flight to quality in lending.  
Using an extensive micro-level dataset, we show that, indeed, after the two recent 
collapses in oil price in 2008 and 2014, firms in resource-dependent countries reduced their 
borrowing and that the effect was similar for resource and non-resource firms. In non-resource 
countries we find no evidence that firms in non-resource sectors would have faced slower 
leverage growth, whereas resource firms did have slower growth in leverage following the oil 
price drop in 2014. Further, we find evidence that flight to quality played its part in resource-
dependent countries, as large and tangible firms with low debt ratios did not reduce their 
borrowing after the oil price collapse and the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. 
However, when the oil price drop in 2014 was not accompanied by a global financial crisis, 
we do not find evidence of flight to quality with our sample firms. 
Due to data limitations we cannot verify to what extent the negative change in debt by 
non-resource firms in resource-dependent countries is attributed to the demand and supply of 
credit. However, our results show clear support for the volatility hypothesis behind the 
resource curse. A collapse in oil price leads to an adverse effect on firm borrowing in resource-
dependent countries for both resource and non-resource firms. 
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Our results are not exhaustive and not easily extrapolated to other types of firms. The 
consequence of an oil price fall could be very different for small unlisted firms or state-owned 
enterprises, and that would be an interesting path for future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 9. Equity indices 
 
 
  
Country Index in Bloomberg Country Index in Bloomberg
1 Argentina Argent Merval 37 Malaysia FTSE Malay KLCI
2 Australia ASX200 38 Mexico MEX IPC
3 Austria ATX Austria Trd 39 Mongolia MSE top 20
4 Bahrain Bahrain All Share 40 Namibia FTSE/Namibia
5 Belgium BEL 20 index 41 Netherlands AEX-index
6 Botswana Botswana Gab 42 New Zealand NZX 50
7 Brazil IBOVESPA 43 Nigeria Nigeria SE All
8 Bulgaria BSE Sofix 44 Norway OBX Stock
9 Canada TSX 45 Oman Muscat SM 30
10 Chile Chile SM Select 46 Pakistan KARACHI 100
11 China CSI300 47 Peru Peru Lima Gen
12 Colombia Colom COLCAP 48 Philippines PSEi Philippine
13 Croatia Zagreb CROBEX 49 Poland WIG 20
14 Czech Republic Prague SE index 50 Portugal PSI General POR
15 Denmark OMX Copenhagen 20 51 Quatar QE index
16 Egypt Egypt Hermes 52 Romania Bucharest BET
17 Estonia OMX Tallinn index 53 Russia RTS Index
18 Finland OMX Helsinki 25 54 Saudi Arabia Tadawull
19 France CAC 40 Index 55 Singapore FTSE Straits Tim
20 Germany DAX Index 56 Slovakia Slovak Share Index
21 Ghana GSE Comp 57 Slovenia Slovenia Blue Chip
22 Greece Athex Composite 58 South Africa FTSE/JSE Africa Top 40
23 Hong Kong Hang Seng 59 South Korea KRX 100
24 Hungary Budapest SE index 60 Spain IBEX35 ESP
25 India S&P BSE SENSEX 30 61 Sweden OMX STKH30
26 Indonesia Jakarta Comp 62 Switzerland Swiss Market Index
27 Ireland ISEQ Overall 63 Taiwan Taiwan TAIEX
28 Israel Tel Aviv 25 64 Tanzania Tanzania all sh
29 Italy FTSE MIB ITA 65 Thailand SE Thai Index
30 Japan Nikkei 225 66 Tunisia Tunis SE
31 Kazakhstan KASE 67 Turkey BIST 100 Index
32 Kenya Nairobi SE 20 68 Ukraine PFTS Index
33 Kuwait Kuwait SE Weighted 69 United Arab Emirates DFM General Index
34 Latvia OMX Riga index 70 United Kingdon FTSE 100 Index
35 Lithuania OMX Vilnius index 71 United States S&P500
36 Luxembourg LuxX 72 Venezuela Venezuela SM
73 Vietnam Ho Chi Minh Stk
Index compositions as of November 2013
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